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REASESSMENT UNDER THE 
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE, 
TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
ACT, AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
STATUTES 
By KENNETH OWEN· 
Pursuing environmental justice is merely advocating social jus-
tice in a socio-physical context-the community biosphere. I 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of "environmental justice" requires "the fair 
treatment of all races, cultures, incomes arid educational levels 
with respect to the development, implementation and enforce-
ment of environmental laws, regulations and policies," with 
"fair treatment 'implying' that no subgroup of people should be 
forced to shoulder a disproportionate share of the negative en-
• LL.M. Environmental Law, Golden Gate University School of law, 1999; J.D., 
Oakland College of Law, 1998. The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful com-
ments and assistance provided by Professors Alan Ramo, Clifford Rechtschaffen and 
Anne Eng, and by the Golden Gate University Law Review staff, especially Lisa Braly. 
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vironmental impacts of pollution or environmental hazards due 
to lack of political or economic strength.,,2 The few reported 
federal cases that have alleged discrimination in environ-
mental justice siting situations under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment have been unsuccessful 
because plaintiffs have been unable to prove intentional or 
purposeful discrimination.3 Communities of color burdened by 
environmental hazards then sought judicial relief under Title 
VI, section 601, of the Civil Rights Act of 1964" Again, how-
ever, the courts required plaintiffs to prove purposeful dis-
crimination.6 . 
This requirement has proven to be a formidable barrier to 
successful environmental litigation. Although the Supreme 
Court has yet to rule on whether a private cause of action can 
proceed under the regulations adopted pursuant to Title VI, 
Section 602,6 which say that minority plaintiffs needed only to 
prove disparate impact to prevail,7 the administrative com-
plaints filed under the regulations have been unsuccessful. S 
Even lawsuits filed under other federal statutes, such as the 
Clean Water Act, have become more difficult because the Su-
preme Court has held that plaintiffs, including minority com-
munities, cannot assert standing under the environmental 
statutes for wholly past violations.9 Communities of color will 
2 
Office of Solid Waste & Emergency Response Envtl. Justice Task Force, U.S. 
Envtl. Protection Agency, Draft; Final Report 17 (1994). 
3 . See generally RI.S.E. Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Va. 1991), affd wlthout 
opinion, 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992); East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-
Bibb County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989), affd, 896 
F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989); Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., 482 F. 
Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979), affd without opinion, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986). 
• Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (West 1999). 
6 See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. 
Comm'n of the City of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 608 n.1 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring). 
6 See Chester Residents v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997), l1acated, 524 U.S. 974 
(1998). 
7 
See 42 U.S.C. §2000d-1 (West 1999). 
s 
See Angela Rowen, EPA MIA, SAN FRANCISCO BAY GUARDIAN, June 10, 1998 
al1ailable at <http://www.sibg.com/Newsl3213610nGuardlindex.html >. 
9 See Steel Co. v. Citizens For A Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998). 
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thus continue to suffer from environmental injustice until ad-
vocates can overcome the barriers to proving intentional dis-
crimination. 
This article will suggest what is required to prevail under 
the purposeful discrimination standard under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In-
terestingly, no equal protection environmental justice case or 
Title VI action has been presented to a jury charged with de-
termining the factual issue of intent. The author will next ex-
plore the possibility of winning environmental justice cases 
under the citizen suit provisions that are part of most envi-
ronmental statutes. Lastly, the author will suggest arguments 
to possible defenses that might be raised by defendants. 
II. PuRPOSEFUL DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION CLAUSE 
A INGENERAL 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides that "no state shall make or enforce any law which 
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal pro-
tection of the laws. ,,10 This guarantee of equal protection ap-
plies to actions by both state arid local governments.11 Federal 
governments are also bound by equal protection principles; 
however, the federal guarantee of equal protection comes from 
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fifth Amendment's 
Due Process Clause.12 While the Equal Protection Clause does 
not apply to "merely private conduct, however discriminatory 
or wrongful," a private party involved in a conspiracy with a 
government official can be held liable under civil rights stat-
utes for violating the Equal Protection Clause. IS "It is enough 
10 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
11 See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 173 (1970). 
12 See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). 
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that he is a willful participant in joint activity with the State 
or its agents. ,,14 
The Equal Protection Clause imposes a general restraint on 
the governmental use of classifications, such as race, gender, 
alienage, illegitimacy, wealth, or any other characteristic. To 
the use of these classifications, a plaintiff can make two types 
of challenges. The first type of challenge is that the statute or 
regulation violates equal protection "on its face," meaning that 
the classification is written into the statute or regulation.15 The 
second type of equal protection challenge is "as applied" and is 
used if the statute or regulation is valid on its face, yet is being 
administered in a purposefully discriminatory way.lS Most 
challenges to governmental decisions with regard to environ-
mental justice concerns will be of this second type. 
In any challenge, a court will apply a strict scrutiny stan-
dard of review to any classification that relates to a suspect 
classification.17 Such classifications include race, national ori-
gin, and sometimes alienage. IS Because the environmental jus-
tice movement, in general, is concerned with governmental 
action that unfairly affects people of color, the equal protection 
environmental justice claims will typically require a strict 
scrutiny standard of review. 19 Under the standard, the classifi-
cation will be upheld only if it is necessary to promote a com-
pelling governmental interest.20 Significantly, the burden is 
14 
Adickes, 398 U.S. at 152 (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 
(1966». 
15 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 191-192 (1976); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 
U.S. 303 (1880). 
16 See Williams v. Dlinois, 399 U.S. 235, 242 (1970). 
17 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
18 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
19 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 
379 U.S. 184 (1964». 
20 . See McLaughlm, 379 U.S. at 192. 
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upon the governmental body to persuade the court that this 
classification does so and is thus constitutional.21 
Strict scrutiny of a suspect classification will only be ap-
plied where the government action is intentional.22 AB the 
United States Supreme Court has said, "[p]urposeful racial 
discrimination invokes the strictest scrutiny of adverse differ-
ential treatment. Absent such purpose, differential impact is 
subject only to the test ofrationality.,,23 Consequently, action by 
the government that produces a disparate impact, without a 
showing of intentional discrimination, does not create a sus-
pect class, and consequently, strict scrutiny is unavailable. 
B. PROVING PuRPOSEFUL DISCRIMINATION 
If the law discriminates on its face, no showing of purpose-
ful discrimination is necessary because "[a] racial classifica-
tion, regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively in-
valid and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justifica-
tion.,,2' Similarly, if the law is neutral on its face and yet is ap-
plied in an invidiously discriminatory manner, statistical proof 
alone is sufficient to prove a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause.2lI The most difficult cases to prove then are where the 
law is racially neutral on its face and ostensibly applied in ac-
cordance with its terms, yet the governmental action results in 
21 See Washington, 426 U.S. at 241 (1976). "With a prima facie case made out, 'the 
burden of proof shifts to the State to rebut the presumption of unconstitutional action 
by showing that permissible racially neutral selection criteria and procedures have 
produced the monochromatic result.' .. ld. (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 
625, 632 (1972». 
22 
See Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U.S. 1, 18 n.8. "Strict scrutiny ofa classi-
fication affecting a protected class is properly invoked only where a plaintiff can show 
intentional discrimination by the Government." ld. (citing Washington, 426 U.S. at 
239-245). 
23 
Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613,6170.5 (1982) (quoting Washington, 426 U.S. at 
247-48). See also Wisconsin, 517 U.S. at 18 n.8. 
~ . Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (quoting 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); McLaughlin, 379 U.S. 184). 
211 
See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 
U.S. 356, 374 (1886). 
5
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a disparate impact. In such cases, to prove that the disparate 
impact, or effect, of the government action is the result of pur-
poseful discrimination requires resort to circumstantial evi-
dence.26 
In 1976, the Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis27 ex-
plicitly required that plaintiffs prove an intent to discriminate 
in order to establish an equal protection violation.28 In Wash-
ington' the plaintiffs had failed a written test to determine 
whether they had acquired the specific level of verbal ability 
and reading comprehension necessary to become a police offi-
cer in the District of Columbia.29 They, as black applicants 
failed, since blacks failed the test four times as frequently as 
whites. so The plaintiffs asserted that this differential impact 
constituted an equal protection violation even though those 
who composed the test had no intent to discriminate against 
blacks.31 The Supreme Court held that .a neutral law does not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause solely because it results in 
a racially disproportionate impact; instead, the disproportion-
ate impact must be traced to an intent to discriminate on the 
b . f 32 aSIs 0 race. 
The Washington plaintiffs might have been successful if 
they had filed a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. The Washington Court conceded that under Title VII, 
"employees or applicants proceeding under it need not concern 
themselves with the employer's possibly discriminatory pur-
pose but instead may focus solely on the racially differential 
impact of the challenged hiring or promotion practices."as The 
26 See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 
252, 266 (1977). 
27 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
28 See id. 
29 See id. at 233.34. 
so See id. at 230. 
31S id ee . 
32 See Washington, 426 U.S. at 242 (emphasis added). 
33 [d. at 238.39. 
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Court, however, refused to establish a disparate impact stan-
dard for the Equal Protection Clause, reasoning that "[ w]e 
have never held that the constitutional standard for adjudi-
cating claims of invidious racial discrimination is identical to 
the standards applicable under Title VII, and we decline to do 
so today.,,34 The logic behind requiring the higher standard for 
proving intentional discrimination under the Equal Protection 
Clause appears to be that government actions, held merely to a 
disparate impact standard, "would be far reaching and would 
raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole 
range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing 
statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the 
average black than to the more affluent white.,,36 Despite this 
reluctance, the purposeful discrimination requirement of 
Washington has thus far been extended to such areas as jury 
selection,36 zoning and public housing,37 and voting rights.36 
C. ARLINGTON HEIGHTS ELEMENTS OF PuRPOSEFUL 
DISCRIMINATION 
The Washington Court further observed that 
"[d]isproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but is not the sole 
touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by 
the Constitution.,,39 One year later, in Village of Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,40 the Su-
preme Court recognized its importance in that "[t]he impact of 
the official action - - whether it 'bears more heavily on one race 
than another' - - may provide an important starting point."'1 
Arlington Heights also said that in addition to an initial 
34 Id. at 239. 
36 Id. at 248. 
36 See generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
37 See generally Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 252. 
3B See generally Rogers, 458 U.S. 613. 
39 . . 
Washlngton, 426 U.S. at 242. 
40 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
41 Id. at 266. 
7
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showing of disproportionate impact, circumstantial evidence is 
required to prove discriminatory intent.42 Such circumstantial 
evidence includes four elements to consider. First, the court 
should consider the historical background of the decision that 
might reveal a series or pattern of government action taken for 
invidious purposes.43 A second consideration is the specific se-
quence of events immediately preceding the action.44 A third 
are any departures, substantive or procedural, from the ordi-
nary decision-making process and a fourth is the legislative or 
administrative history, such as contemporary statements by 
members of the decision-making body, minutes of its meetings, 
46 
or reports. 
1. Statistical Evidence of Disparate Impact 
Prevailing under the Arlington Heights standard is not im-
possible, but it does require a clear understanding of each 
component of the inquiry. Statistics are the starting point of 
any successful equal protection challenge and, in rare cases, 
statistics alone can prove intentional discrimination. "Some-
times a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than 
race, emerges from the effect of the state action even when the 
governing legislation appears neutral on its face.,,46 In Yick Wo 
v. Hopkins,47 for example, the Supreme Court reversed a con-
viction under a municipal ordinance, which was "fair on its 
face and impartial in appearance.,,46 Yick Wo involved a San 
Francisco ordinance requiring that all laundries housed in 
wooden buildings be licensed before operating:9 Yick Wo, a 
Chinese citizen, applied for and was refused permission to op-
erate his laundry, and was thereafter convicted of a violation of 
42 See id. 
43 See id. at 267. 
44 See id. 
46 See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267. 
46 [d. at 266. 
47 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
48 [d. at 373. 
49 See id. at 357. 
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the ordinance and sentenced to imprisonment. 50 The Board of 
Supervisors of San Francisco granted all but one of the eighty 
non-Chinese applicants and denied all two hundred Chinese 
applicants. 61 The Court held: 
The fact of this discrimination is admitted. No reason for it 
is shown, and the conclusion cannot be resisted, that no reason 
for it exists except hostility to the race and nationality to 
which the petitioners belong, and which in the eye of the law is 
not justified. The discrimination is therefore illegal, and the 
public administration which enforces it is a denial of the equal 
protection of the laws, and a violation of the fourteenth 
amendment of the constitution. 62 
In Yick Wo, the disparate impact by itself was sufficient to 
prove invidious discrimination.53 Similarly, in Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot,64 an Alabama statute changed the city boundaries 
from a square to a twenty-eight-sided figure, allegedly remov-
ing "all save only four or five of its 400 Negro voters while not 
removing a single white voter or resident.,,66 The effect of Ala-
bama's redefining the city boundaries clearly discriminated 
against blacks; before the change they had had constituted 
forty percent of the registered voters, after they accounted for 
only a percent or two of the new city.1i6 "[T]he Court concluded 
that the redrawing of Tuskegee, Alabama's municipal bounda-
ries left no doubt that the plan was designed to exclude 
blacks. ,,67 
Cases such as Yick Wo and Gomillion, however, are rare. 
"Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion or Yick Wo, 
50 See id. at 358. 
61 
See id. at 359-360. 
62 
Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 374. 
53 See id. 
64 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
66 ld. at 34l. 
56 See id. at 348. 
57 
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U .. S. 900, 913 (1995). 
9
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impact alone is not determinative and the Court must look to 
other evidence.,,58 The point at which this must be done is still 
unclear as the Court has drawn no bright line. In Washington 
v. Davis, Justice Stevens' concurring opinion observed that 
"the line between discriminatory purpose and discriminatory 
impact is not nearly as bright, and perhaps not quite as criti-
cal, as the reader of the Court's opinion might assume."I59 Thus, 
the advocate should look for statistics that approach the stan-
dard established in Yick Wo and Gomillion as that would end 
the inquiry. The closer the statistical impact approaches Yick 
Wo and Gomillion, the less need for other circumstantial evi-
dence to prove intent. 
In several jury-selection cases, however, the Court has 
found a constitutional violation even when the statistical pat-
tern did not approach the extremes of Yick Wo or Gomillion.60 
In Turner v. Fouche,61 cited by the Court in Arlington Heights, 
the Court recognized: 
The undisputed fact was that Negroes composed only 37% 
of the Taliaferro County citizens on the 304-member list from 
which the new grand jury was drawn. That figure contrasts 
sharply with the representation that their percentage (60%) of 
the general Taliaferro County population would have led them 
to obtain in a random selection.62 
From this evidence, the Court held that appellants had 
made out their prima facie case of jury discrimination because 
they could show both a substantial disparity between the per-
centages of Negro residents and those on the new jury list and 
that the disparity initiated, at least in part, during a portion of 
the selection process where the jury commissioners invoked 
58 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266. 
59 Washington, 426 U.S. at 254. 
60 See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 n.13. 
61 396 U.S. 346 (1970). . 
62 [d. at 359. 
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their subjective judgment.63 Turner thus stands for the fact 
that a substantial disparity, that is, a participation reduction 
from sixty percent to thirty-seven percent, is sufficient for a 
prima facie showing. While this is a long way from the one 
hundred percent reduction demonstrated by Yick Wo, the ad-
vocate must still show a disparate impact. 
Generally, in environmental justice cases, census tracts or 
zip codes have been utilized for demonstrating disparate im-
pact. While these methods have been helpful, more sophisti-
cated approaches could be more effective at showing disparate 
impact. For example, the district court in Bean v. Southwestern 
Waste Management COrp.64 found useful the plaintiffs' defini-
tion of "minority" and "Anglo" census tracts.65 The plaintiffs 
suggested that since the city of Houston's population is thirty-
nine percent minority and sixty-one percent Anglo, then a mi-
nority census tract is one with more than thirty-nine percent 
minority population and Anglo census tracts are those with 
more than sixty-one percent Anglo population.66 Interestingly, 
the court suggested that "[i]t may be that more particularized 
data would show that even those sites approved in predomi-
nantly Anglo census tracts were actually located in minority 
neighborhoods, but the data available here does not show 
that.,,87 The court concluded that if the solid waste sites were 
located next to minority communities in predominantly Anglo 
census tracts, "the outcome of this case would be quite differ-
ent. ~ The case might also have been different depending on 
the size of the area affected by a solid waste site. "If it affects a 
smaller area than the census tract, it becomes particularly im-
portant to know where in each census tract the site is located. 
If it affects a larger area than the census tract, then a target 
63 . See id. at 360. 
64 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979), affd without opinion, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 
1986). 
65 • See id. at 677. 
66 • See id. at 679. 
67 
Id. at 677. 
68 
Id. at 680. 
11
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area of analysis becomes much more persuasive.',69 Conse-
quently, statistics, and the way they are presented, can have a 
significant impact on the outcome of an environmental justice 
equal protection case. 
2. Historical Background of the Decision 
Statistical evidence of discriminatory impact can be suffi-
ciently supplemented by the types of proof outlined in Arling-
ton Heights. For instance, in Griffin v. County School Board Of 
Prince Edward CO.,70 a group of Negro children sued the 
County School Board of Prince Edward County, Virginia in 
1951, alleging that they had been denied admission to public 
schools attended by white children.71 In 1954, the Supreme 
Court held that the Virginia segregation laws denied equal 
protection to the Negro children and ordered the school board 
to desegregate.72 The board, instead, closed its public schools.73 
Since the private schools, supported by state and local tuition 
grants and tax credits, were operated only for whites, Negro 
children could not attend school. 74 In 1964, the Supreme Court 
was finally able to put an end to the legal maneuvering by the 
state of Virginia by holding that closing the public schools also 
denied blacks equal protection.76 This case thus illustrates that 
a historical pattern showing invidious discrimination of "resis-
tance at the state and county level, by legislation, and by law-
suits," can circumstantially prove discriminatory intent. 76 
Likewise, Davis v. Schnelln shows that the historical back-
ground can prove discriminatory intent. In Davis, ten Negro 
69 
Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 680. 
70 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
71 
See ill. at 220. 
72S ill ee . 
73 See id. 
74 See ill. at 222.23. 
76 See Griffen, 377 U.S. at 232. 
76 [d. at 229. 
77 
81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D.Ala. 1949), affd, 336 U.S. 933 (1949). 
12
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citizens of Mobile County, Alabama challenged the validity of 
an Amendment to the Alabama Constitution, which required 
that only those persons who could understand and explain any 
article of the Federal Constitution could be registered as elec-
tors in Alabama elections.78 The plaintiffs alleged that the 
amendment was intended to prevent black citizens from exer-
cising their right to vote.79 The district court took judicial no-
tice of the history of the period immediately preceding the 
adoption of the amendment to support its conclusion that the 
amendment violated the equal protection clause.so 
Yet another example lies within Keyes v. School District No. 
1. Denver. Colorado.81 On the issue of segregative intent, the 
Court recognized that "a finding of intentional segregation as 
to a portion of a school system is not devoid of probative value 
in assessing the school authorities' intent with respect to other 
parts of the same school system.,,82 Indeed, when the case in-
volves a single school board, it is highly relevant since "the 
prior doing of other similar acts, whether clearly a part of a 
scheme or not, is useful as reducing the possibility that the act 
in question was done with innocent intent."ss 
Such "prior doings," if able to develop into a pattern estab-
lishes "a prima facie case of unlawful segregative design on the 
part of school authorities, and shifts to those authorities the 
burden of proving that other segregated schools within the sys-
tem are not also the result of intentionally segregative ac-
tions.,,84 Advocates thus should look for a historical pattern of 
discrimination in equal protection environmental justice cases 
to supplement the statistical evidence of disparate impact. 
78 See id. at 874. 
79 S id ee . 
so See id. at 878, 880. 
81 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
82 [d. at 207. 
83 [d. 
84 
Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208. 
13
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3. Specific Sequence of Events 
Statistical evidence of discriminatory impact can also be 
supplemented by the specific sequence of events immediately 
preceding the action.85 For example, in Arlington Heights, the 
plaintiff attacked the village's refusal to rezone land from sin-
gle-family to multiple-family, a rezoning that would have al-
lowed construction of low-income integrated housing.86 While 
the Court held that the Village's refusal did not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause, it also suggested that if the property 
had always been zoned for multiple-family use, but had then 
been changed to single-family classification when the inte-
grated project was proposed, "we would have a far different 
case."s7 
4. Departures from Normal Procedures 
Statistical evidence of discriminatory impact can also be 
supplemented by departures from the normal procedural se-
quence, such as, for example the elimination of public hearings 
on the siting of a solid waste facility. In addition to procedural 
departures, substantive ones are also relevant, "particularly if 
the factors usually considered important by the decisionmaker 
strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached."ss In Dai-
ley v. City of Lawton,89 for example, the plaintiffs purchased a 
former school site in a predominantly white residential neigh-
borhood and planned to build low-income housing on the site.90 
The plaintiffs applied to the planning commission for the re-
quired zone change, which was objected to by a petition signed 
by about 250 white neighbors.91 The planning commission then 
refused to rezone the land even though the surrounding area 
85 See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267. 
86 See ill. at 254-55. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 425 F.2d 1037 (lOth Cir. 1970). 
90 See id. at 1038. 
91S ill ee . 
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was zoned high density and that both the present and former 
director testified that from a zoning standpoint there was no 
reason why the school site should not be rezoned high 
density.92 From this evidence, the Court found there to be a 
sufficient showing "that the public bodies acted as they did be-
cause of the opposition to the project by the residents of the 
North Addition.''''3 Thus, "the record sustain[ed] the holding of 
racial motivation and of arbitrary and unreasonable action in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and of [section] 
1983.,,94 
5. Legislative or Administrative History 
Statistical evidence of discriminatory impact can also be 
supplemented by the legislative or administrative history, "es-
pecially where there are contemporary statements by members 
of the decision-making body, minutes of its meetings, or re-
portS.""6 Consequently, advocates should inquire into the leg-
islative history of the statute or regulation for any evidence of 
racial prejudice. No matter how much time has elapsed, a pro-
vision will continue to be a violation of equal protection so long 
as it has a discriminatory impact.96 
D. BEYOND ARLINGTON HEIGHTS 
Significantly, Arlington Heights provides a five part inquiry 
into the types of evidence that might support a prima facie 
showing of discriminatory intent.97 This inquiry, however, was 
not meant to be exhaustive; twenty years after Arlington 
Heights, the Supreme Court in Reno v. Bossier Parish School 
92 . See id. 93 Id. at 1039. 
94 . Dalley. 425 F.2d at 1040. 
95 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268. 
96 See Keyes. 413 U.S. at 210-11. See also Hunter v. Underwood. 471 U.S. 222, 229-
30 (1985). 97 
See id. at 268. 
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Board98 has continued to advise courts to look to the Arlington 
Heights framework for guidance in "examining discriminatory 
purpose in cases brought under the Equal Protection Clause.,,99 
Once a prima facie case of intentional discrimination is es-
tablished, the state must rebut the presumption of unconstitu-
tional action by showing that it use racially neutral criteria 
and procedures.100 This burden can prove difficult for defen-
dants as Turner v. Fouche101 illustrated. There, the state failed 
to prove that it had "included or excluded no one because of 
race."102 Similarly, in Keyes, the Court held that it was insuffi-
cient for the state to rely on "some allegedly logical, racially 
neutral explanation for their actions. "103 Instead, their burden 
was to prove that "segregative intent was not among the fac-
tors that motivated their actions."l04 Additionally, in Dailey, 
the Court held that plaintiffs' prima facie case "must be met by 
something more than bald, conclusory assertions that the ac-
tion was taken for other than discriminatory reasons. "105 This 
burden requires the defendant to show that the governmental 
action would have occurred anyway, even without the dis-
criminatory intent.106 If the state could establish that it would 
have taken the same action despite a discriminatory motive, 
the plaintiff could no longer claim that the state improperly 
considered race and the defendant would have satisfied the 
burden of proof.107 
98 
. 520 U.S. 471 (1997). 
99 [d. at 488. 
100 See Washington, 426 U.S. ~t 241 (1976) (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 
U.S. 625, 632). See also Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 270 n.21. 
101 396 U.S. 346 (1970). 
102 [d. at 360-61. 
103 
Keyes, 413 U.S. at 210. 
104 [d. 
105 Dailey, 425 F.2d at 1039-40. 
106 
See w. 
107 See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 270 n.21. 
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Although the Arlington Heights five-part inquiry is useful, 
there is not a bright-line test for proving discriminatory pur-
pose. The Court did, however, began to develop a more precise 
definition of intentional discrimination in Personnel Adminis-
trator of Massachusetts v. Feeney.los In this case, Feeney, a 
woman and nonveteran, challenged a Massachusetts statute 
that gave veterans an "absolute lifetime" preference for consid-
eration for state civil service jobs as discriminatory against 
women in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.109 Although 
she had passed a number of open competition civil service ex-
aminations for better jobs, because of the preference statute, 
she was ranked in each instance lower than male veterans who 
had achieved lower test scores than herself; ninety-eight per-
cent of veterans were male.110 Although the Court observed 
that "[t]he enlistment policies of the Armed Services may well 
have discriminate[ed] on the basis of sex,,,111it nevertheless 
held that "when the totality of the legislative actions estab-
lishing and extending the Massachusetts veterans' preference 
are considered, the law remains what it purports to be: a pref-
erence for veterans of either sex over nonveterans of either sex, 
not for men over women. ,,112 The C9urt thus concluded that 
while the substantial edge granted to veterans may reflect an 
unwise policy, Feeney "ha[d] simply failed to demonstrate that 
the law in any way reflect[ed] a purpose to discriminate on the 
b . f ,,113 aSIs 0 sex. 
Feeney is significant in clarifying and distinguishing the 
presumption that a person intends the natural and foreseeable 
consequences of his voluntary actions.114 Specifically, the Court 
declared that while it would be inaccurate to state that the 
impact on women was unintentional because they were fore-
lOS 442 u.S. 256 (1979). 
109 See id. at 259. 
110 See id. at 264, 269-70. 
111 Id. at 278. 
112 Id. at 280 (quoting Washington, 426 U.S. at 2(2). 
113 Feeney, 442 U.S. at 281. 
114 See id. 
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seeable, equal protection requires the plaintiff to prove that 
the action was taken precisely because of, not in spite of, the 
discriminatory impact. ll5 The Court's clarification of intent 
thus reaffirmed and added to the Arlington Heights framework 
for guidance in determining whether a particular act was mo-
tivated by discriminatory animus. ll6 More significantly, the 
Court reaffirmed the notion that when governmental action 
has a disparate impact on a group, "a strong inference that the 
adverse effects were desired can reasonably be drawn.,,117 The 
Court cautioned, however, that this inference is a tool, not 
proof of discriminatory intent. ll6 Since the impact here was 
unavoidable, the policy favoring veterans was legitimate, and 
there was no evidence demonstrating discriminatory intent, 
the inference was not helpful to the plaintiffs. ll9 
Rogers v. Lodge120 further elaborated on the meaning of in-
tent under the equal protection clause. In Rogers, the plaintiffs 
argued that the at-large election system for Burke County, 
Georgia violated the Equal Protection Clause because it di-
luted the voting strength of the minority population.121 Ac-
cording to the 1980 census, the population of Burke County 
was fifty-four percent black; however, blacks constituted only 
thirty-eight percent of the registered voters.l22 As a result, "[n]o 
Negro ha[d] ever been elected to the Burke County Board of 
Commissioners. ,,123 From these facts and from the district 
court's inquiry into the "ability of blacks to participate effec-
tively in the political process,,,I24 the Court affirmed the district 
ll5 See id. at 278-79 (quoting United Jewish Org. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 179 (1977) 
(concurring opinion». 
ll6 See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 488 (1997). 
ll7 
Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279 n.25. 
ll8 S id ee . 
ll9 See id. 
120 458 U.S. 613 (1982). 
121 See id. at 616-71. 
122 See id. at 615. 
123 [d. 
124 [d. at 624. 
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court's conclusion that "historical discrimination had restricted 
the present opportunity of blacks effectively to participate in 
the political process."l25 Additionally, the Court held that al-
though the election method was 'racially neutral when 
adopted, [it was] being maintained for invidious purposes"l28 
and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause. As Rogers il-
lustrates, an additional element that an advocate should in-
quire into is the due process afforded to communities of color 
with regard to any governmental action. Examples of impor-
tant topics to question are whether the process provides them 
with notice of public meetings of the government action, 
whether communities of color can participate in the proceed-
ings, and whether the advocates are allowed to present evi-
dence on behalf of the minority communities. The answer to 
these questions can add to the totality of relevant facts neces-
sary to prove intent. 
In Rogers v. Lodge, the law was racially neutrai when 
adopted; conversely, in Hunter v. Underwood/27 the adoption of 
a law in 1901, although racially neutral on its face, was moti-
vated by a desire to discriminate against blacks on account of 
race.
l28 Per this law, which disenfranchised persons convicted 
of any crime, including misdemeanors, involving moral turpi-
tude, the plaintiffs, one black and one white, were blocked 
from the voter rolls because they had each been convicted of 
the misdemeanor of cashing a bad check.l29 In blocking the 
plaintiffs, the Board of Registrars relied on opinions of the At-
125 Rogers, 458 U.S. at 625. In affirming the district court's findings of fact and con-
clusions of law, the Court recognized that the district court applied the proper test 
outlined in Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights: 
. Although both cases -rejected the notion that a law is invalid under 
the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater por-
tion of one race than another ... both cases recognized that discrimi-
natory intent need not be proven by direct evidence. 'Necessarily, an 
invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the total-
ity of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law 
bears more heavily on one race than another.' .. [d. at 618. 
126 [d. at 616 (emphasis in original). 
127471 U.S. 222 (1985). 
128 See id. at 230. 
129 See id. at 224. 
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torney General, which held that the misdemeanor of cashing a 
bad check was a crime involving moral turpitude. lso Interest-
ingly, arguably more serious crimes, such as second-degree 
manslaughter, assault on a police officer, and mailing pornog-
raphy, were not considered crimes involving moral turpitude. lsl 
Nevertheless, as a result of this law, blacks were disenfran-
chised approximately ten times more than whites and had 
done so from its inception. ls2 While the counsel for the gov-
ernment defendants conceded that race was a factor in adopt-
ing the law, they argued that the purpose of the law was to 
disfranchise poor people, blacks and whites alike and that this 
motive was permissible under the Equal Protection Clause. 183 
The Court, however, held that while the law may have been 
adopted to discriminate against poor people, it would not ne-
gate the fact that the state intended to discriminate against all 
blacks. l84 A mixed motive, therefore, did not immunize the gov-
ernmental action from an equal protection challenge.lso Conse-
quently, once the plaintiffs proved that racial discrimination 
was a "substantial" or "motivating" factor behind the law, de-
fendants had to demonstrate that the law would have been 
enacted anyway.1SO Here, because the evidence clearly showed 
that, in 1901, the motivation for the provision in the Alabama 
Constitution was to discriminate against blacks, the law was 
unconstitutional. 
E. EQUAL PROTECTION ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CASES 
Within this Arlington Heights framework, the plaintiffs in 
the three reported federal equal protection environmental jus-
IS0 S ill ee . 
131 See ill. at 227. 
IS2 
See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 227. 
183 See ill. at 230. 
184 See ill. at 232. 
185 S ill ee . 
136 See ill. at 228. 
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tice cases were unable to prove intentional discrimination.137 
Nevertheless, much can be learned from these cases and an 
advocate for the environmental justice movement should not ,be 
discouraged from pursuing an equal protection case if the evi-
dence supports a cause of action. For example, in Bean v. 
Southwestern Waste Management COrp.,t38 the Texas Depart-
ment of Health ("TDH") granted a permit to defendant South-
western Waste Management to operate a solid waste facility in 
a minority community.139 In response, the plaintiffs sought a 
preliminary injunction against the decision as being racially 
discriminatory in violation of their civil rights.14O To obtain a 
preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs must, among other 
things, show a substantial likelihood of success on the 
merits.141 The plaintiffs, however, failed to do so because the 
statistical data they offered did not rise to the level of dis-
criminatory intent.142 Further, plaintiffs' assertion of a dis-
criminatory pattern or practice in the placement of solid waste 
sites was similarly unavailing. l43 Accordingly, the plaintiffs 
could not prove discriminatory intent. 144 
Regarding the plaintiffs' second theory of liability, which 
was that "TDH's approval of the permit, in the context of the 
historical placement of solid waste sites and the events sur-
rounding the application, constituted discrimination," the court 
found that the statistical evidence, although not focused on 
TDH's actions so much as the historical trend, still failed un-
137 See generally R.I.S.E. Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Va. 1991), affd with· 
out opinion, 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992); East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. 
Macon·Bibb County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989), 
affd, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989); Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., 
482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979), affd without opinion, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986). 
138 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979). 
139 
See id. at 675. 
140 See id. 
141 S id ee . at 676. 
142 See id. at 677. 
143 
See Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 677. 
144 See id. 
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der close scrutiny.145 The court was persuaded by the Assistant 
Attorney General's argument that the historical placement of 
sites in the eastern half of the city was "because that is where 
Houston's industry is, not because that is where Houston's mi-
nority population is.,,146 This reasoning, however, while suffi-
cient for the district court at the time, might not hold up under 
the subsequent Supreme Court decision in Hunter v. Under-
wood,147 where the Court held that the presence of the second, 
non-discriminatory motive, would not immunize the govern-
mental action from an equal protection challenge. 
Even though it ruled against the plaintiffs' motion for a 
preliminary injunction, the district court in Bean was sympa-
thetic to the plaintiffs' situation and said that if it were TDH it 
might have not granted the permit. l48 This was because "[i]t 
simply does not make sense to put a solid waste site so close to 
a high school, particularly one with no air conditioning. Nor 
does it make sense to put the land site so close to a residential 
neighborhood. ,,149 The court then noted that "[ t]he failure of the 
plaintiffs to obtain a preliminary injunction does not, of course, 
mean that they are foreclosed from obtaining permanent relief 
. .. . assuming the case goes forward, discovery could lead to 
much more solid and persuasive evidence for either side." 150 
Consequently, the court also denied TDH's motion to dismiss 
the complaint. l5l 
In the second reported equal protection environmental jus-
tice case, East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb 
County Planning & Zoning Commission,162 the plaintiffs al-
leged that the Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning Com-
146 1d. at 678. 
146 
1d. at 679. 
147 471 U.S. 222 (1985). 
148 
Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 679. 
149 1d. at 679-80. 
160 
1d. at 680. 
151 See id. at 681. 
162 706 F. Supp 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989), affd, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th eir. 1989). 
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mission's ("Commission") decision to allow the creation of a 
private waste landfill in a minority census tract was motivated 
in part by considerations of race in violation of their equal pro-
tection rights. 163 Following extensive discovery by the parties, 
the court conducted a non-jury trial and concluded that in light 
of the Arlington Heights five part inquiry, "this court is con-
vinced that the Commission's decision to approve the condi-
tional use in question was not motivated by the intent to dis-
criminate against black persons. "154 In support, the court ob-
served that the other landfill approved by the Commission was 
in a majority while neighborhood at that this fact disrupted 
the asserted patter of discrimination with respect to the loca-
tion of landfills. 166 The district court, erroneously applying the 
rather difficult statistical standard established in Yick Wo and 
Gomillion, thus concluded that there was not a clear pattern of 
racially motivated decisions.166 The court then, rather cursorily, 
applied Arlington Heights and concluded that the Commis-
sion's action did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.167 
In the most recently reported federal decision, R.I.S.E. Inc. 
v. Kay,166 Virginia plaintiffs challenged a decision of the King 
and Queen County Board of Supervisors, which approved a 
solid waste landfill site in a predominantly black area of the 
county, as a violation of their equal protection rights. 169 While 
the district court found that "[t]he placement of landfills in 
King and Queen County from 1969 to the present has had a 
disproportionate impact on black residents," the court con-
cluded that "the plaintiffs have not provided any evidence that 
satisfies the remainder of the discriminatory purpose equation 
163 See id. at 88l. 
154 [d. at 884 (quoting Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266. 
166 S id ee . 
166 . See id. at 885. 
167 See East Bibb Twiggs, 706 F. Supp. at 887. 
166 768 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Va. 1991), affd without opinion, 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 
1992). 
169 S id 43 ee . at 11 . 
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set forth in Arlington Heights."l60 In so holding, the court rea-
soned, that approving the site of the landfill was based on en-
vironmental factors, not race.161 This conclusion seems to fly in 
the face of the court's own findings of historical facts which 
reveal a pattern of official actions taken for invidious purposes. 
Specifically, the court first found that the population of King 
and Queen County is approximately fifty percent black and 
fifty percent white.162 Second, it found that sixty-four percent 
of the blacks live within a half mile radius of the proposed 
landfill site and that while twenty-one of the twenty-six fami-
lies living along the three mile stretch of landfill bound traffic 
are black, the other five are white.l63 Third, the court found 
that at the time the Mascot landfill was sited in 1969 and the 
population living within a one mile radius of the site was one 
hundred percent black. l64 The court next found that when the 
Dahlgren landfill was sited i:t;l 1971, the estimated ninety-five 
percent of the population living in the immediate area were 
black.l65 The court's final finding was that not only was the 
Owenton landfill was sited in 1977 when an estimated one 
hundred percent of the residents living within a half-mile ra-
dius of the landfill were black, but that the First Mount Olive 
Baptist Church, a black church, was located one mile from the 
landfill. l66 These facts alone should have satisfied the Yick Wo 
and Gomillion standard because the pattern was "unexplain-
able on grounds other than race."167 The court, however, was 
persuaded by the state's assertion that the approval of the 
sites was based on the relative environmental suitability of the 
sites. l68 Furthermore, the district court's reasoning seems to 
160 R.I.S.E. Inc., v. Kay, 768 F. Supp, 1144, 1149 (E.D. Va. 1991). 
161 See id. at 1150. 
162 See id. at 1148. 
163 See R.I.S.E. Inc., 768 F. Supp. at 1148. 
164 S id ee . 
165 S id ee . 
166 See id. at 1148. 
167 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 (citing Gomillion, 364 U.S. 339; Yick Wo, 118 
U.S. 356 (emphasis added). 
168 See R.I.S.E. Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1150. 
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ignore the Supreme Court's holding in Hunter v. Underwood, 
which instructs that even though there could be two purposes 
that motivated the governmental action, and yet only one of 
these was discriminatory against the suspect class, the pres-
ence of the second, non-discriminatory motive would not im-
munize the governmental action from an equal protection 
challenge.169 If such had been followed, the burden of proof 
would have then shifted to the defendants who would have had 
to show "something more than bald, conclusory assertions that 
the action was taken for other than discriminatory reasons. ,,170 
In other words, the defendant would have had to show that the 
governmental action would have occurred anyway, even with-
out the intent. As this might have been difficult, if the district 
court had applied the proper legal standard, the results could 
have been different. 
F. APPLYING EQUAL PROTECTION PRINCIPLES TO 
HYPOTHETICAL SITUATIONS 
Applying the principles discussed above to a number of hy-
pothetical equal protection environmental justice cases illus-
trates an effective approach to the challenge posed by proving 
discriminatory intent. Because Robert Bullard has observed 
that Environmental Justice is concerned with the distribution 
of the benefits and burdens of environmental protection, the 
author suggests that a benefit versus burden framework is the 
best way to analyze environmental equal protection claims171 
In such an analysis, the first step is to identify the groups 
benefited and burdened by the government action. One method 
of identification is by census tract data.172 
169 
See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 231. 
170 
Dailey, 425 F.2d at 1040. 
171 See Robert D. Bullard, Race and Environmental Justice in the United States, 18 
YALE J. INT'L. L. 319, 334 (1993). Robert Bullard is Ware Professor of Sociology and 
Director of the Environmental Justice Resource Center at Clark Atlanta University in 
Atlanta, Georgia. 
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To illustrate some examples, the hypothetical County of 
San Franjustco was chosen. See Figure 1. San Franjustco 
County has a total population of 100,000 and is divided into 
ten census tracts, A through J, each with a population of 
10,000. The total population of San Franjustco County is fifty 
percent minority and fifty percent white. Therefore, a minority 
census tract is one with more than fifty percent minority 
population and a white tract is one with more than fifty per-
cent white population.173 Accordingly, by definition, Figure 1 
indicates that Census Tracts C, D, F, G, and J are minority 
census tracts. Conversely, Census Tracts A, B, E, H, and I are 
white census tracts. 
Example 1 
The San Franjustco County Board of Supervisors approves 
a solid waste landfill in Census Tract F, a minority census 
tract with a minority population of eighty percent. In this case, 
only the residents of Census Tract F can use the solid waste 
landfill. Thus, the landfill site both benefits and burdens the 
entire population of Census Tract F. In this situation, there is 
no disparate impact, and consequently no violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause because both the minority population 
and white population are benefited and burdened equally. 
Example 2 
The Board of Supervisors approves a solid waste landfill in 
Census Tract I, a white census tract with a white population of 
seventy percent. As above, only Census Tract F residents can 
use the landfill; thus, the site both benefits and burdens the 
entire population of Census Tract I. In this situation, there is 
no apparent disparate impact. Bean suggests, however, that 
more particularized data could indicate that even those sites 
approved in predominantly white census tracts were actually 
located in minority neighborhoods within the tract. For in-
stance, suppose the thirty percent minority population is 10-
173 Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 679 (applying the court's definition of "minority census 
tract" and "Anglo census tract"). 
26
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2000], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol30/iss3/2
2000] ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 405 
cated within one neighborhood of Census Tract I, and the solid 
waste landfill is located in the minority neighborhood. In such 
circumstances, "a strong inference that the adverse effects 
were desired can reasonably be drawn. "174 A showing of dispa-
rate impact on the minority neighborhood within the white 
census tract would then require supplemental evidence to sup-
port a prima facie case of intentional discrimination. An advo-
cate would then be justified in searching for additional circum-
stantial evidence under the Arlington Heights framework. 
Example 3 
The Board of Supervisors approves a solid waste landfill in 
Census Tract G, a minority census tract with a minority 
population of ninety percent. As above, the landfill site both 
benefits and burdens the entire population of Census Tract G, 
at least initially. The Board of Supervisors, instead of approv-
ing a solid waste landfill in Census Tract E, a white census 
tract with a white population of ninety percent, approves the 
expansion of the solid waste facility in Census Tract G, and 
allows the population of Census Tract E to transport its solid 
waste to the facility in Census Tract G. The population of Cen-
sus Tract G is disparately burdened by E's garbage and the 
population of Census Tract E is disparately benefited by the 
Board's decision. A situation like this comes close to the stan-
dard established in Yick Wo and Gomillion. Little, if any, sup-
plemental evidence should be necessary to prove a prima facie 
case of intentional discrimination. 
Example 4 
The Board of Supervisors approves the permits for the con-
struction of two powerplants, which benefit the entire county. 
One powerplant is approved for construction in Census Tract 
B, a white census tract with a white population of sixty per-
cent, and the other is approved for construction in Census 
Tract C, a minority census tract with a minority population of 
sixty percent. As East Bibb Twiggs suggests, there is no 
174 
Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279 n.25. 
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showing of disparate impact, unless the plaintiff can show a 
pattern of placing the powerplants in minority neighborhoods 
within the census tracts. 
The above examples suggest that the starting point of an 
equal protection challenge could very well be the ending point. 
Clearly, without disparate impact, there is no equal protection 
violation. What might appear at first blush to be an environ-
mental justice issue may simply be the only area to site a par-
ticular facility. The advocate thus must make an intelligent 
assessment of the impact before taking on the case. 
G. SUMMARY 
The plaintiffs in the three reported federal equal protection 
environmental justice cases, which relied on the Arlington 
Heights framework, were unable to prove intentional discrimi-
nation.175 Unfortunately, judges, acting as the fact finder, de-
cided all these cases. It is strongly suggested that had a jury, 
especially one composed of a representative minority commu-
nity, decided the factual issue of discriminatory intent, the re-
sults might have been quite different. 
III. PuRPOSEFUL DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VI OF THE 
CML RIGHTS ACT 
A. IN GENERAL 
Some environmental justice advocates, frustrated by the 
discriminatory intent standard under the Equal Protection 
Clause, have turned to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
section 601 of which provides that "[n]o person in the United 
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity re-
175 See generally R.l.S.E. Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1141, affd without opinion, 977 F.2d 
573 (4th Cir. 1992); East Bibb Twiggs, 706 F. Supp 880, affd, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 
1989); Bean, 482 F. Supp. 673, affd without opinion, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986). 
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ceiving Federal financial assistance.,,176 Section 602 authorizes 
and directs federal agencies to issue rules and regulations to 
implement this prohibition.177 Before these rules and regula-
tions can become effective, however, Presidential approval 
must be obtained.17s Once that is obtained, federal agencies, 
such as the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), are 
authorized to terminate aid to state or local agencies that re-
ceive federal funds or to take any other step authorized by 
law.179 Before aid may be terminated, however, the head of the 
Federal Department or agency must file a written report of the 
circumstances and grounds for such action with the commit-
tees of the House of Representatives and Senate having legis-
lative jurisdiction over the program or activity involved.1so Fur-
thermore, no action becomes effective until thirty days have 
elapsed after the filing of such report.1S1 After the thirty days 
and after federal aid has been terminated, Section 603 of Title 
VI affords judicial review of agency orders to halt federal aid.1s2 
Title VI was "meant to cover only those situations where 
federal funding is given to a non-federal entity which, in turn, 
provides financial assistance to the ultimate beneficiary."l83 In 
these situations, funds may be halted or denied for any pro-
gram or activity defined in section 606 that receives federal 
assistance by way of grant, loan, or contract other than a con-
tract of insurance or guaranty.l84 Thus, when a department or 
agency of a state or local government receives federal financial 
176 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (West 1999). 
177 Id. § 2000d-1. 
17S S id ee . 
179 S id ee . 
180 
See id. 
lSl See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1. 
lS2 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2 (West 1999). 
183 Williams v. Glickman, 931 F. Supp. I, 6 (D.D.C. 1996) (quoting Soberal-Perez v. 
Heckler, 717 F.2d 36, 38 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929 (1984». See also 42 
U.S.C. § 2000d-4a (West 1999). 
184 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a (West 1999Xadded by the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 
1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988). 
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assistance, Title VI coverage extends to all programs or activi-
ties, "including those programs and activities that are not 
EPA-funded."l86 "Program or activity" is defined as "all of the 
operations of a state department or agency, not just the spe-
cific program or activity receiving federal funds. ,,186 Conversely, 
"Title VI does not apply to programs conducted directly by fed-
al . ,,187 er agenCIes. 
The threshold question in a Title VI case then, is whether 
the state or local government defendant is receiving federal 
funds. Typically, federal financial assistance for environmental 
protection to state and local governments is extensive because 
most federal environmental laws provide funding for state pro-
grams.l86 On an annual basis, the EPA awards financial assis-
tance in the form of grants to state and local agencies that ad-
minister continuing environmental programs under statutes 
that EPA is charged to administer, including the Clean Air 
Act,189 the Clean Water Act,190 and the solid Waste Disposal 
Act.191 Thus, it should not be too difficult for the environmental 
justice advocate to establish a federal financial nexus under 
Title VI. 
B. GUARDIANS REQUIRES PROOF OF PuRPOSEFUL 
DISCRIMINATION 
In Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Commission of New 
York,t92 the Supreme Court decided whether Title VI reaches 
186 EPA, Interim Guidance for Investigation of Title VI Administrative Complaints 
Challenging Permits 3 (Feb.1998) <http://www.e8.epa.gov/oeca/oejltitlevi.html>. 
lS6 Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1250 (M.D.Ala. 1998). 
187 Williams, 931 F. Supp. at 5 (quoting Fagan v. United States Small Bus. Admin., 
783 F.Supp. 1455, 1456 n.10 (D.D.C. 1992), affd., 19 F.3d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
186 Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing 'Environmental Justice': The Distributional Effects 
of Environmental Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787 (1993). 189 42 U.S.C. § 7401(West 1999). 
190 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (West 1999). 
191 
42 U.S.C. § 6901 (West 1999). 
192 463 U.S. 582 (1983). 
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both intentional and disparate-impact discrimination.l93 
Guardians involved a class of minority police officers who 
claimed that the City of New York violated Title VI by ap-
pointing and terminating officers based on an examination 
that had a discriminatory impact on African-American and 
Hispanic candidates. 11M Although seven members of the court 
agreed that proving a violation required discriminatory intent, 
the rationale behind that rule did not command a majority.196 . 
Justice Powell even remarked in his concurring opinion that 
the lack of a majority opinion would "further confuse rather 
than guide" the law interpreting Title VI.l96 Two years later, in 
Alexander v. Choate,197 a unanimous Court clarified the holding 
of Guardians and established a two-part test to determine 
whether a violation had occurred.198 In the first prong, the 
Court held that Title VI directly reached only intentional dis-
crimination.l99 In the second, the Court held that disparate im-
pact claims were governed by agency regulations implementing 
Title VI.2OO 
In Cannon v. University of Chicago,201 cited in Guardians, 
eight justices agreed that Title VI applied to private actions 
against a state or local agencies that received federal funds.202 
Furthermore, they recognized that the question of whether a 
plaintiff has a cause of action "is analytically distinct and prior 
to the question of what relief, if any, a litigant may be entitled 
to receive.,,203 Thus, when answering the first prong in Alexan-
193 See id. at 584. 
11M 
See id. at 585. 
196 
See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985). 
196 . • Guardians, 463 U.S. at 608 (Powell, J., concurnng). 
197 469 U.S. 287 (1985). 
198 
See id. at 293. 
199 See id. 
200 See id. 
201 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
202 Guardians, 463 U.S. at 594-595. 
203 
Id. at 595. 
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der, "[t]he usual rule is that where legal rights have been in-
vaded and a cause of action is available, a federal court may 
use any available remedy to afford full relief.,,204 Consequently, 
in Guardians, Justice White, announcing the judgment of the 
Court, concluded, "compensatory relief, or other relief based on 
past violations of the conditions attached to the use of federal 
funds, is not available as a private remedy for Title VI viola-
tions not involving intentional discrimination.,,206 In other 
words, damages are available in a private cause of action only 
for intentional violations of Title VI. Supporting this interpre-
tation, the Court in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public 
Schools,206 observed that the clear majority of the Guardians 
Court "expressed the view that damages were available under 
Title VI in an action seeking remedies for an intentional viola-
tion, and no Justice challenged the traditional presumption in 
favor of a federal court's power to award appropriate relief in a 
cognizable cause of action.,,207 
C. TITLE VI REGULATIONS ONLY REQUIRES PROOF OF 
DISPARATE IMPACT 
Soon after Title VI was enacted, a Presidential task force, 
including the Justice Department, produced model Title VI 
enforcement regulations mandating that "recipients of federal 
funds not use criteria or methods of administration which have 
the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination.,,208 There-
after, seven federal agencies and departments carrying out this 
mandate quickly promulgated regulations that applied a dis-
parate impact or effects test.209 Thus, while a cause of action 
204 [d. 
206 [d. at 602-603 (emphasis added). 
206 503 U.S. 60 (1992). 
207 [d. at 70. See also Lane v. Pens, 518 U.S. 187, 191(1996) (citing Franklin for the 
interpretation that a "clear majority" of the Court in Guardians confirmed that dam-
ages were available for intentional violations of Title VI). 
208 Guardians, 463 U.S. at 618 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) 
(citing 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(bX2) (1964». 
209 See ill. 
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brought under the statute requires proof of discriminatory in-
tent, an administrative claim filed with a federal agency under 
the regulations requires only proof of disparate impact. 
After the initial promulgation of regulations, all Cabinet 
Departments and about forty federal agencies adopted stan-
dards barring programs with a discriminatory impact.21o In 
1984, pursuant to Section 602 of Title VI, EPA's Office of Civil 
Rights ("OCR"), which handles Title VI complaints, similarly 
issued regulations prohibiting recipients from using: 
criteria or methods of administering its program which 
have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimina-
tion because of their race, color, national origin, or sex, 
or have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing 
accomplishment of the objectives of the program with 
respect to individuals of a particular race, color, na-
t · al .. . 211 Ion ongm or sex. 
Unfortunately, environmental justice groups have had little 
success filing Title VI complaints with the EPA. As a result, 
environmental justice groups from around the country met 
from May 31 to June 1, 1998 in Oakland, California for the 
annual conference of the National Environmental Justice Ad-
visory Council ("NEJAC") to demand that the Environmental 
Protection Agency prosecute polluters of low-income and mi-
nority communities under its regulations.212 In response to this 
210 See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 619 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "Regulations of the 
Cabinet Departments are as follows. Dept. of Agriculture, 7 C.F.R. § 15.3(bX2) (1982); 
Dept. of Commerce, 15 CF.R. § 8.4(bX2) (1982); Dept. of Defense, 32 C.F.R. § 
300.4(bX2) (1982); Dept. of Education, 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(bX2) (1982); Dept. of Energy, 
10 C.F.R. §§ 1040.13(c), (d) (1982); Dept. of Health and Human Services, 45 C.F.R. §§ 
80.3(bX2), (3) (1982); Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, 24 C.F.R. §§ 1.42(2Xi), 
(3) (1982); Dept. of Interior, 43 C.F.R. §§ 17.3(b)(2), (3) (1982); Dept. of Justice, 28 
C.F.R. §§ 42.104(bX2), (3) (1982); Dept. of Labor, 29 C.F.R. §§ 31.3(bX2), (3) (1982); 
Dept. of State, 22 C.F.R. § 141.3(bX2) (1982); Dept. of Transportation, 49 C.F.R. §§ 
21.5(bX2), (3) (1982); Dept. of Treasury, 31 C.F.R. § 51.52(b)(4) (1982). For a listing of 
the federal agencies with such standards, see CFR Index (1982)." [d. at n.7. 
211 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (1999) (emphasis added). 
212 
See Angela Rowen, EPA MIA, SAN FRANCISCO BAY GUARDIAN (June 10, 1998) at 
1 available at <http://www.sibg.com/Newsl3213610nGuardlindeLhtml >. 
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demand, Ann Wood, head of the OCR, told environmentalists 
that the agency does not have the resources to process all the 
complaints it receives.218 Indeed, EPA has received fifty Title 
VI complaints since 1993 and of those, twenty-eight have been 
rejected, fifteen are under investigation, and seven are pending 
approval or rejection; not one, however, has been upheld.214 
In February of 1998, the OCR released its Interim Guidance 
for Investigation of Title VI Administrative Complaints Chal-
lenging Permits, which is intended to provide a framework for 
processing the increasing number of Title VI complaints al-
leging discriminatory effects from the issuance of pollution con-
trol permits by state and local agencies that receive EPA 
funding.216 As explained in the Guidance, one of the conditions 
for receiving funding under EPA's continuing environmental 
program grants is that the recipient agencies comply with 
EPA's Title VI regulations for as long as any EPA funding is 
extended.216 In the event that EPA finds discrimination in a 
recipient's permitting program and the recipient is not able to 
come into compliance voluntarily, EPA is required by its Title 
VI regulations to initiate procedures to deny, annul, suspend, 
or terminate EPA funding. 217 EPA may also use any other 
means authorized by law, including a referral of the matter to 
the Department of Justice, to obtain compliance.218 
In Select Steel Corp. of America, the first case to be adjudi-
cated under Title VI regulations and EPA's Interim Guidance, 
EPA dismissed the complaint after an investigation and adju-
dication that lasted an incredibly short period of only two 
months.219 Within this time frame, as outlined in EPA's In-
218 S id ee . 
214 S id ee . at 2. 
216 See EPA, Interim Guidance supra note 185. 
216 .•• See 40 C.F.R. § 7.80(a)(2)(w) (1999). 
217 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 7.115(e), 7. 130(b) (1999). 
218 
See 40 C.F.R. § 7.130(a) (1999). 
219 See EPA File No. 5R-98-R5 (Select Steel Complaint) available at 
<http://www.epa.gov/reg500pa/8teelcvr.htm> (Complaint filed June 9, 1998; Accepted 
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terim Guidance, EPA was to follow five basic steps in analyz-
ing the allegations of discriminatory effects from a permit deci-
sion. In the first step of this process, EPA was "to identify the 
population affected by the permit that triggered the com-
plaint.,,220 In Select Steel, however, EPA found no adverse effect 
from the permitted activity, and therefore, found no discrimi-
natory effect that would violate Title VI and EPA's imple-
menting regulations.221 EPA had thus conducted merely a cur-
sory one-step evaluation and dismissed the complaint without 
considering steps two through five. 
It is interesting to note that EPA's Interim Guidance states 
that an individual may file a private right of action in court to 
enforce the nondiscrimination requirements in Title VI or 
EPA's implementing regulations without first exhausting ad-
ministrative remedies.222 This statement is supported by a 
footnote to the Third Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in 
Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif.22B The 
Supreme Court, however, has subsequently vacated Chester 
Residents.224 Thus, whether a private right of action exists to 
enforce the regulations is unclear. 
The existence of. this right is also unclear because on Octo-
ber 21, 1998, funds for the Interim Guidance were suspended 
until the Guidance became finalized. 225 As of March 3, 2000, 
for Investigation on August 17, 1998; Dismissed on October 30, 1998). "After reviewing 
all of the materials submitted and information gathered during the investigation, EPA 
has not found a violation of Title VI and EPA's implementing regulations. Accordingly, 
EPA is dismissing the complaint as of the date of this letter." Id. at 5. 
220 
EPA, Interim Guidance supra note 185 at 8. "The affected population is that 
which suffers the adverse impacts of the permitted activity." Id. 
~1. . See EPA File No. 5R-98-R5 (Select Steel Complamt). 
222 • See id. at 3. 
22B • See id. at 10. 
224 
See 524 U.S. 974 (1998). 
225 . 
See H.R. 4194, Department of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Devel-
opment, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999 (Enrolled Bill, Sent to 
President) signed on October 21, 1998. "[N]one of the funds made available in this Act 
may be used to implement or administer the interim guidance issued on February 5, 
1998." Id. . 
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OCR was still in the process of revising the Interim Guidance, 
with no date proposed for publishing the Final Guidance. 226 
Whenever this Guidance is finally published, however, it may 
or may not allow for a private right of action, as it does now, 
without first exhausting the Title VI administrative complaint 
procedures as is currently required by well-settled case law. 
Moreover, it may be difficult to circumvent the Supreme 
Court's reasoning that "[ w ]here the rights of individuals are 
affected, it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own pro-
cedures.,,227 Nevertheless, while funding is still unavailable 
any administrative complaints filed after October 21, 1998 will 
. 228 be processed under the regulations. 
D. CHESTER RESIDENTS PROVIDES FOR A PRIVATE CAUSE OF 
ACTION UNDER TITLE VI REGULATIONS 
In Chester Residents for Quality Living v. Seif,229 city resi-
dents and a nonprofit public interest corporation brought an 
action against the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental 
Protection Agency based on Title VI and EPA's regulations re-
garding the issuance of permits for the construction of waste 
facilities.23O The defendants moved to dismiss for both failure to 
state a claim under Title VI, as the plaintiffs did not allege dis-
criminatory intent, and for failure to state a claim under EPA 
regulations, as there is no private right of action under them.231 
The district court granted the defendants motion to dismiss 
Claim I, which alleged that the defendants violated Title VI, 
because they did not allege discriminatory intent; the court, 
however, granted plaintiffs' leave to amend their complaint.232 
The court also dismissed Claims II and III, which alleged that 
226 
Telephone Interview with Michael Mattheisen, Program Analyst, US EPA, Of-
fice of Civil Rights (March 3, 2000). 227 
Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199,235 (1974). 
228 See id. See also 40 C.F.R. §§ 7.120-7.130 (1999). 
229 
944 F. Supp. 413 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
230 See id. at 414-15. 
231 
See id. at 415. 
232 
See id. at 417 
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the defendants violated EPA's regulations, finding no private 
cause of action existed under the EPA civil rights regulations 
promulgated pursuant to section 602 of Title VI.233 Subse-
quently, the plaintiffs decided not to amend their complaint 
and the district court therefore entered a final judgment on 
that count.234 This may have been an error for the plaintiffs 
given the apparent disparate impact and supporting historical 
evidence of discrimination.235 
The plaintiffs, nevertheless, appealed to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit the issue of whether a 
private right of action exists under the regulations promul-
gated pursuant to Section 602 of Title VI.236 In analyzing this 
issue, the Third Circuit stated that because Guardians did not 
decide whether a private right of action existed under the sec-
tion and because it was a case of first impression for the cir-
cuit, it would apply its own three-prong test to determine 
whether such a right existed in this case.237 After doing so, the 
Third Circuit concluded "that private plaintiffs may maintain 
an action under discriminatory effect regulations promulgated 
by federal administrative agencies pursuant to section 602 of 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.,,236 
Following the Third Circuit's decision on December 30, 
1997, the defendants then filed a Petition for Writ of Certio-
rari.239 Two months later, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
233 . See ill. 
234 Chester Residents v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 928 (3d Cir. 1997). 
235 See Chester Residents, 944 F. Supp. 413. Plaintiffs point to defendants grant of 
five waste facility permits for facilities located within Chester since 1987. Only two 
Census Tracts in all of Delaware County contained more than one waste facility and 
both of these were located in areas with populations that were predominately African-
American. See ill. at 415-16. 236 
See Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 927. 
237 See ill. at 929, 933. 
238 ld. at 937. 
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was granted.240 On August 17, 1998, however, the Supreme 
Court vacated the Third Circuit's decision as moot because four 
months earlier, in April 1998, the petitioners had revoked the 
waste facilities permit after it had failed to apply for an exten-
sion.241 The Court thus remanded the case back to the Third 
Circuit with instructions to dismiss, citing United States v. 
Munsingwear, Inc.242 Under Munsingwear, the "established 
practice of the Court in dealing with a civil case from a court in 
the federal system which has become moot while on its way 
here or pending [a] decision on the merits is to reverse or va-
cate the judgment below and remand with a direction to dis-
miss.,,243 This procedure not only allows for "future relitigation 
of the issues between the parties and eliminates a judgment, 
review of which was prevented through happenstance," but 
also preserves the rights of all the parties and prejudices no 
244 
one. 
Because the Supreme Court's decision clears the path for 
future litigation, if the Pennsylvania Department of Environ-
mental Protection Agency reissues the permit for the construc-
tion of the waste facility, another plaintiff would have to retry 
the issue of whether a private right of action exists under dis-
criminatory effect regulations promulgated by federal adminis-
trative agencies pursuant to section 602 of Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. As of now, because of the vacated decision, 
the Supreme Court has never decided the issue. Several other 
circuit courts nevertheless seem to believe that an implied 
cause of action in federal district court exists under Title VI 
regulations. 
240 See Seifv. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living, 524 U.S. 915 (1998), 
cerl granted (U.S. June 8, 1998) (No. 97-1620). 241 See Seif, 524 U.S. 974. 
242 340 U.S. 36 (1950). 
243 
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E. SEVERAL CIRCUIT COURTS PROVIDE FOR A PRIvATE CAUSE 
OF ACTION UNDER TITLE VI REGULATIONS 
While the Third Circuit in Chester Residents correctly ob-
served that the Supreme Court in Guardians did not "explicitly 
address whether a private right of action exists under dis-
criminatory effect regulations promulgated under section 
602,,,246 other Circuit Courts have expressly found that a pri-
vate cause of action can be maintained in federal district court 
under the regulations. In David K. v. Lane,246 for example, the 
Seventh Circuit observed that "[i]t is clear that plaintiffs may 
maintain a private cause of action to enforce the regulations 
promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.,,247 The 
court also observed, however, that "plaintiffs need not show 
intentional discriminatory conduct to prevail on a claim 
brought under these administrative regulations. Evidence of a 
discriminatory effect is sufficient.,,248 
In another Seventh Circuit case, Gomez v. Illinois State 
Board Of Education,249 the court recognized that "[a]lthough 
the voting of the Justices may be difficult for the reader to dis-
cern at first, a majority of the Court in Guardians Association 
concluded that a discriminatory-impact claim could be main-
tained under those regulations, although not under the stat-
ute.,,250 The Seventh Circuit, however, clearly misconstrued 
Guardians for the proposition that "the plaintiffs Title VI 
claim based on the implementing regulations survives the de-
fendant's 12(b)(6) challenge.,,261 
245 • Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 929. 
246 839 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1988). 
247 ld. at 1274 (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); 
Guardians, 463 U.S. 582. 
246 lei. 
249 811 F.2d 1030, 1044-1045 (7th Cir. 1987). 
250 . 
ld. at 1044-1045 (quoting Guardians, 463 U.S. at 607, D. 27, 608, D. 1). 
251 ld. at 1045. 
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In another case, Larry P. v. Riles,252 the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals held that "proof of discriminatory effect suffices to 
establish liability when the suit is brought to enforce regula-
tions issued pursuant to the statute rather than the statute 
itself.,,253 While the Ninth Circuit accurately quotes Justice 
Powell's footnote in Guardians, the very next sentence states 
that "the regulations may be enforced only in a suit pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. § 1983; anyone invoking the implied right of action 
under Title VI would be limited by the discriminatory-intent 
standard to prove violations of Title VI.,,254 The latter state-
ment is incorrect because the Supreme Court, in Alexander v. 
Choate, which was decided later, held that "actions [by state 
agencies receiving federal funds] having a disparate impact on 
minorities could be redressed through agency regulations de-
signed to implement the purposes of Title VI.,,255 Consequently, 
the Ninth Circuit's reasoning that it has subject-matter juris-
diction over Title VI disparate-impact claims is clearly errone-
ous. 
The Eleventh Circuit, in Elston v. Talladega County Board 
of Education,256 stated that "the regulations promulgated pur-
suant to Title VI may validly proscribe actions having a dispa-
rate impact on groups protected by the statute, even if those 
actions are not intentionally discriminatory.,,257 Thus, without 
ever deciding the issue, the Eleventh Circuit assumed that 
there was a private right of action in federal district court to 
redress violations of Title VI regulations. 
Similarly, in Villanueva v. Carere,258 the Tenth Circuit as-
sumed, without ever deciding that it had subject-matter juris-
252 793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1984). 
253 [d. at 981·82 (quoting Guardians, 463 U.S. at 608 D. 1 (Powell, J., CODCurring) 
(emphasis added). 
2M • • GuardlGns, 463 U.S. at 608 D.1 (emphasls added). 
255 
Alexander, 469 U.S. at 293 (emphasis added). 
256 997 F.2d 1394 (11th Cir. 1993). 
257 [d. at 1406 (quoting Guardians, 463 U.S at 584, D. 2). 
258 85 F.3d 481 (lOth Cir. 1996). 
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diction over Title VI regulations, that a private right of action 
was available under the regulations.259 The Court observed 
that "[a]lthough Title VI itself proscribes only intentional dis-
crimination, certain regulations promulgated pursuant to Title 
VI prohibit actions that have a disparate impact on groups pro-
tected by the act, even in the absence of discriminatory 
intent.,,260 The Tenth Circuit then went on, without jurisdic-
tion, to uphold the "district court's findings that neither the 
school closings nor the opening of PSAS resulted in a negative 
disparate impact on the Hispanic population. ,,261 Thus, the 
court found for the appellees with respect to the parents' Title 
VI claims.262 Significantly, the district court, as well as the 
Tenth Circuit, assumed jurisdiction for an implied right of ac-
tion under the regulations. Thus, it would appear that the 
courts are confusing the term "claim under the regulations" for 
a "claim under a lawsuit" filed in federal district court. 
While a number of circuit court of appeal decisions seem to 
allow a private cause of action under the regulations in federal 
district COurt,263 the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Choate2&f. 
seems to suggest that there is no private right of action in fed-
eral district court under Title VI regulations when it held that 
"actions having an unjustifiable disparate impact on minorities 
could be redressed through agency regulations designed to im-
plement the purpose of Title VI.,,266 This, more significantly, is 
supported by EPA Title VI regulations, which expressly pro-
vide private parties with an administrative mechanism 
through which they can raise allegations of unintentional dis-
259 S id ee . 
260 1d. at 486 (quoting Guardians, 463 U.S. at 584, n. 2). 
261 1d. at 487. 
262 S id ee . 
263 See Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 936-37 (collecting cases). 
264 469 U.S. 287 (1985). 
266 1d. at 293 (emphasis added). See also Guardians, 463 U.S. at 610, n.3 (Powell, 
J., concurring). "Congress's creation of an express administrative procedure for reme-
dying violations strongly suggests that it did not intend that Title VI rights be enforced 
privately either under the statute itself or under § 1983." 1d. (emphasis added). 
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crimination.266 Because it is axiomatic that plaintiffs must first 
exhaust administrative remedies, the environmental justice 
advocate must first look to the agency regulations for proce-
dures to resolve state actions that have an unjustifiable dispa-
rate impact on communities of color. 
F. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 
Regardless of whether the Title VI regulations allow for a 
private right of action, administrative actions thereunder may 
be challenged in Federal District Court under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act ("APA,,).267 Under this Act, a plaintiff need 
not establish a private right action under a statute.268 Rather, 
because EPA's Title VI regulations provide for a federal ad-
ministrative complaint process,269 any agency action can be 
challenged under the APA.270 Where Title VI agency regula-
tions do not provide for an administrative complaint procedure, 
however, the advocate could presumably go directly to district 
urt 271 co . 
Judicial review under the APA requires both federal agency 
action and finality. Regarding the first requirement of a fed-
eral agency action, Section 702 provides in part, "[a] person 
suffering legal wrong because of agency action, . . . is entitled 
to judicial review thereof. tt272 Moreover, an action in Federal 
District Court, which seeks a relief other than money damages 
266 See 40 C.F.R. §§7.120-7.130 (1999). "A person who believes that he or she or a 
specific class of persons has been discriminated against in violation of this part may 
tile a complaint." [d. at § 7.120(a). 267 See 5 U.S.C.A §§ 701(a), 702 (West 1999). 
266 See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 317 (1979). See also California v. Si-
erra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981). 
269 
40 C.F.R. § 7.120-7.130 (1999). 
270 5 U.S.C. § 551 (West 1999). 
271 
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 406 (1970) ("neither the principle of 'exhaustion 
of administrative remedies' nor the doctrine of 'primary jurisdiction' has any applica-
tion" to a situation where the agency lacks procedures for complainants to "trigger and 
participate in" the administrative process). See also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 707, n. 41. 272 . 
5 U.S.C. § 702 (West 1999). 
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and states a claim that an "agency or an officer or employee 
thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under 
color of legal authority" will not be dismissed or denied "on the 
ground that it is against the United States or that the United 
States is an indispensable party.,,273 In other words, Section 
702 waives the sovereign immunity of the United States in 
suits seeking judicial review of agency actions where judicial 
review has not been expressly authorized by statute.274 Judicial 
review under the AP A thus may be denied only if Congress 
clearly intended to foreclose review or the issue is one commit-
ted to agency discretion.275 
The second requirement under the AP A is that agency ac-
tion must be final before judicial review will be permitted. Sec-
tion 704 provides in part that "[a]gency action made reviewable 
by statute and final agency action for which there is no other 
adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review. ,,276 
On the other hand, "a preliminary, procedural, or intermediate 
agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to 
review on the review of the final agency action. ,,277 The courts 
have imposed this finality element as a pragmatic considera-
tion to precede judicial review of administrative actions.278 
When determining whether an agency action is final, the Su-
preme Court in FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of California,279 held 
that three factors must be considered: (1) whether the agency 
action represented a definitive statement of the agency's posi-
tion; (2) whether the action had a direct and immediate effect 
of the day-to-day business of the complaining parties; and (3) 
whether judicial review would interfere with the proper func-
273 Id. (emphasis added). 
274 See Parola v. Weinberger, 848 F.2d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 1988). 
275 See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (West 1999). 
276 5 U.S.C. § 704 (West 1999) (emphasis added). 
277 Id. 
278 See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105·107 (1977); Abbott Laboratories v. 
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967). 
279 449 U.S. 232 (1980). 
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tioning of the agency and the courts.280 Because an EPA rejec-
tion or ultimate dismissal of a Title VI Administrative Com-
plaint satisfies these three elements, a plaintiff could seek re-
view in Federal District Court under the APA.281 Even if an 
agency action does not meet these requirements, it may still be 
subject to judicial review when the harm to the person seeking 
review outweighs the harm to the administrative process from 
permitting such review.282 Under this exception, when an 
agency action, or inaction, will endanger public health or 
safety, judicial review is immediately available.283 
In addition to these two requirements, judicial review, as a 
general matter, is not available until the plaintiff has ex-
hausted all administrative remedies.284 The purpose of this is 
to protect agency autonomy, and to promote judicial 
efficiency.285 The principle of autonomy recognizes that agen-
cies, not courts, should have responsibility for the programs 
that Congress has charged them to administer.286 The principle 
of judicial efficiency recognizes that if the complaint is resolved 
at the agency level, judicial review may never be required, or if 
the complaint is not resolved, at least a useful record may be 
produced.287 There are, however, exceptions to the exhaustion 
requirement. The most significant is that administrative 
remedies need not be pursued if the litigant's interest in im-
mediate judicial review outweighs the government's interests 
in efficiency or administrative autonomy.288 Application of this 
280 See id. at 239-240. 
281 See 5 U.S.C. § 703 (West 1999). Cf. Clark v. Busey, 959 F.2d 808, 813 (9th Cir. 
1992) (agency inaction on petition for rule making is not ripe for review where inaction 
does not amount to denial). 
282 See Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1098-1099 (D.C. Cir. 
1970). 
283 See id. 
284 
See Meyers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938). 
285 
See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992). 
286 • See id. 
287 
See id. 
288 . See id. at 146. 
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balancing principle is "intensely practical ... because attention 
is directed to both the nature of the claim presented and the 
characteristics of the particular administrative procedure pro-
vided.,,289 One significant factor of this balancing, which a court 
will look at in determining whether to allow immediate review 
of agency action, is the irreparable injury to the plaintiff.290 
Once· a plaintiff has satisfied these requirements, a court 
will then review the action under the APNs standard of re-
view. Unlike other statutes, the APNs standard narrow and 
presumes that the agency action is valid.291 The agency action, 
however, is not shielded from a "thorough, probing, in-depth 
review.tt292 Additionally, while the APA does not give a court 
power "to substitute its judgment for that of the agency," it 
does allow the court to "consider whether the decision was 
based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether 
there has been a clear error of judgment.tt293 Consequently, un-
der the Administrate Procedure Act, a court must set aside an 
agency's action only if the decision is "arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.tt294 
Normally, an agency action is considered arbitrary and capri-
cious when the agency bases its decision on factors that Con-
gress did not want considered, completely fails to consider an 
important aspect of the issue, makes a decision that is con-
trary to law and the evidence before it, or offers an explanation 
for its decision that is so implausible that it cannot be attrib-
uted to a difference of opinion or agency expertise.295 Moreover, 
under environmental statutes, an action may be arbitrary and 
289 d L . 
290 . See ill. at 147. 
291 See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert denied, 426 U.S. 941 
(1976). 
292 •• CItizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971). 
293 [d. at 416. 
294 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (West 1999) . 
. 295 
See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mut., 463 U.S. 29,43 (1983). 
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capricious if the agency has not "considered the environmental 
consequences" of its action.296 
In addition to reviewing an agency's action for a clear error 
of judgment, a court also has the ability to review the agency's 
adherence to applicable regulations and agency programs.297 
Thus, an individual who is adversely affected or aggrieved by 
agency action, such as ·EPA's failure to comply with Title VI 
Regulations, "may ask a court to set aside the agency action 
which is not in accordance with law or to compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld.n298 Under section 706(1), when so re-
quested, "[t]he reviewing court shall compel [an] agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.,,299 Consequently, 
the environmental justice advocate should review the federal 
regulations to insure that EPA is complying with the Title VI 
regulations and that EPA is not unreasonably delaying ad-
ministration of the regulations.3°O If EPA is not complying with 
the regulations in a timely manner, an action should be filed in 
Federal District Court challenging the EPA's actions under the 
APA. 
As another general matter, judicial review is not available 
unless the plaintiff has standing. To have standing to sue un-
der the Administrative Procedure Act, a plaintiff's alleged in-
jury must be within the zone of interests protected by the stat-
ute allegedly violated.30l While environmental justice plaintiffs 
may have standing to sue under the AP A, the state action 
complained of in the Title VI complaint may elude judicial re-
view if the complained of project proceeds to completion. Un-
296 Strycher's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1979). 
297 See Community Action of Laramie County, Inc. v. Bowen, 866 F.2d 347, 352 
(10th Cir. 1989) (collecting case8 for principle that agency's "failure to follow ita own 
regulations ... may be challenged under the APA"). 
298 • NAACP v. Secretary of Housmg & Urban Development, 817 F.2d 149, 152 (1st 
Cir.1987). 
299 • 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (West 1999) (emphaSIS added). 
300 See, e.g., EPA Regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 7.120 (1999). 
301 See Association of Data Processing Service Orgs, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 
151-53 (1970). 
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fortunately, because EPA cannot issue injunctions under the 
regulations and because Title VI Administrative Complaints 
can take as long as two years to resolve, it is imperative that 
the environmental justice advocate get his foot in the federal 
court door as quickly as possible to avoid irreparable injury.802 
As the Ninth Circuit recognized in Fair v. United States 
E.P.A.,808 "[t]he sole reason this case 'evaded review' is the ap-
pellants' failure to take requisite action. They posted no bond 
accompanying their request for a preliminary injunction with 
the district court, nor did they seek a stay of the district court's 
judgment pending this appeal.,,304 
An interesting situation arises when the environmental jus-
tice advocate has both a Title VI claim for intentional dis-
crimination as well as the lessor included claim of disparate 
impact. Does the advocate file a Title VI complaint in federal 
district court against the state or local agency for intentional 
discrimination and concurrently file an administrative com-
plaint with the federal agency, such as the EPA, for state 
agency actions having a disparate impact? While no court has 
addressed this specific issue, some guidance can be found in 
the judicially created doctrine of "primary jurisdiction." If the 
doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable, the court must 
allow the agency to go first.305 
In deciding the case of United States v. Western Pacific 
Railroad CO.,806 the Supreme Court was forced to consider at 
the outset whether .the lower court had properly applied the 
primary jurisdiction doctrine; that is, the court considered 
whether the lower court had "correctly allocated the issues in 
the suit between the jurisdiction of the [agency] and that of the 
802 See McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 147 (administrative remedy deemed inadequate 
"[m]ost often ... because of delay by the agency"). 
803 795 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1986). 
304 [d. at 855. 
305 See Texas & Pacific Railway v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907). 
306 352 U.S. 59 (1956). 
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COurt.,,307 In holding that "[t]he doctrine of primary jurisdiction, 
like the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies, 
is concerned with promoting proper relationships between the 
courts and administrative agencies charged with particular 
regulatory duties,,,308 the Supreme Court stated that while the 
exhaustion rule "applies where a claim is cognizable in the first 
instance by an administrative agency alone,,,309 primary juris-
diction "applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the 
courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim 
requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory 
scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an 
administrative body.,,310 Additionally, with regard to exhaus-
tion, 'judicial interference is withheld until the administrative 
process has run its course," for primary jurisdiction "the judi-
cial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the 
administrative body for its views.,,311 This referral of issues to 
the administrative agency, however, "does not deprive the 
court of jurisdiction. ,,312 Rather, the court still has the discre-
tion to either "retain jurisdiction or, if the parties would not be 
unfairly disadvantaged, to dismiss the case without 
prejudice.,,313 Consequently, applying the doctrine of primary 
jurisdiction to a Title VI claim when both intentional discrimi-
nation and disparate impact is alleged would suggest that the 
administrative agency would first determine the lesser-
included claim of disparate impact. Once this issue of dispa-
rate impact is determined by the agency, the court could re-
sume jurisdiction to determine whether the disparate impact 
could be supported with the circumstantial evidence necessary 
to prove intentional discrimination. 
307 [d. at 62. 
308 [d. at 63. 
309 [d. 
310 [d. at 54. 
311 
Western Pacific, 352 U.S. at 54. 
312 
Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258,268-269 (1993). 
313 [d. 
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In cases where primary jurisdiction is found, the court 
must decide what to do with a case that it has remanded to the 
agency. The Supreme Court in Best v. Humboldt Mining CO. 314 
considered just that issue. In Best, the United States sued in 
district court to condemn certain real property, the mining 
claims on which were arguably invalid.316 With regard to these 
claims, the Supreme Court held that the Bureau of Land Man-
agement had primary jurisdiction.316 The Court, however, also 
held that the district court should retain the condemnation 
case on its docket for a trial on the remaining issues after the 
Bureau resolved the claim dispute.317 
In cases where primary jurisdiction is found inapplicable, 
however, the court may proceed with its action regardless of 
the happenings in the agency proceeding. In Nader v. Alle-
gheny Airlines, 3~8 for example, a plaintiff who was "bumped" 
from an airline flight because of overbooking sued the airline 
in a common law fraud action.319 Although the Civil Aeronau-
tics Board ("CAB") had the power to order airlines to cease un-
fair and deceptive practices, the Supreme Court permitted the 
action to continue in federal district court because a CAB pro-
ceeding would not have been as effective.320 The CAB had no 
power to award damages to the plaintiff nor could it immunize 
the airline from damages in any future suitS.321 Similarly, in 
Great Northern Railroad Co. v. Merchants' Elevator CO.,322 the 
Supreme Court held that a court might also maintain jurisdic-
314 371 U.S. 334 (1963). 
316 
See id. at 334-335. 
316 
See id. at 339. 
317 
See id. at 340. 
318 426 U.S. 290 (1976). 
319 
See id. at 293. 
320 
See id. at 305-306. 
321 
See id. at 302. 
322 259 U.S. 285 (1922). 
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tion over the matter where it needs no special expertise to re-
view the administrative action.323 
Since the law is not yet settled in the area of concurrent Ti-
tle VI claims, it is suggested that the advocate file claims in 
both federal district court and the federal agency under the 
regulations to avoid any statute of limitations issues.3u 
G. SUMMARY 
A private cause of action can be maintained under Title VI 
against state and local agencies, which receive federal funds, 
for damages as well as for declaratory and injunctive relief un-
der the discriminatory intent standard. Conversely, under Ti-
tle VI regulations the only relief available is limited to an equi-
table remedy since damages are only available for intentional 
violations of Title VI. Despite this, an environmental justice 
advocate should first look to the regulations for any adminis-
trative process through which to resolve administrative com-
plaints as an advocate may be required to exhaust all Title VI 
administrative remedies prior to filing a cause of action in fed-
eral court under the AP A. 326 The Title VI regulations adopted 
by EPA may provide a clue for how EPA will investigate and 
resolve such an administrative complaint.326 An advocate, how-
ever, may not be required to exhaust all remedies when the 
agency action, or inaction, will endanger public health or 
safety or result in irreparable injury to plaintiffs. In such case, 
judicial review is immediately available. During this process, a 
suit for damages for intentional violations of Title VI can be 
tried before a jury; equitable relief under the APA, however, is 
going to be decided by a judge. The advocate's best chance for 
success is to get the case before a jury, especially one composed 
323 See [d. at 294. 
324 See infra notes 465-468 and accompanying text for a discussion of timely filing. 
325 See Paul K. Sonn, Fighting Minority Underrepresentation in Publicly Funded 
Construction Projects After Croson: A Title VI Litigation Strategy, 101 YALE L.J. 1577, 
1581 n. 25 (1992) (listing all federal cabinet Departments with Title VI regulations 
codifying the discriminatory effect standard). 
326 See 40 CFR § 7.120 (1999). 
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of the representative minority population affected by the gov-
ernment's decision. 
IV. CITIZEN SUIT PROVISIONS UNDER FEDERAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES 
A INGENERAL 
Title VI was "meant to cover only those situations where 
federal funding is given to a non-federal entity which, in turn, 
provides financial assistance to the ultimate beneficiary."s27 
Title VI, therefore, is inapplicable to programs conducted di-
rectly by federal agencies,328 such as the Clean Water Act,329 
the Safe Drinking Water Act,330 the Clean Air Act,331 the Solid 
Waste Disposal Act,332 the Emergency Planning and Commu-
nity Right-to-Know Act,333 and the Toxic Substance Control 
Act.334 Environmental justice advocates thus have relied on the 
citizen suit provisions contained in these, and most other fed-
eral environmental statutes, to enforce federal programs. Gen-
erally, the citizen suit provisions in virtually all the major fed-
eral environmental statutes provide that "any citizen may 
commence a civil action on his own behalf.,,335 Furthermore, the 
327 Williams v. Glickman, 931 F. Supp. I, 6 (D.D.C. 1996). See also 42 U.S.C. § 
2000d4a (West 1999). 
328 See id. at 5.6. 
329 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 - 1387 (West 1999). 
330 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300£ - 300j-26 (West 1999). 
331 See id. §§ 7401 - 7671q. 
332 See id. §§ 6901 - 6992k. 
333 See id. §§ 11001 to 11050. 
334 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601- 2692 (West 1999). 
335 See, e.g., Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a) (West 1999); Clean 
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (West 1999); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
300j-8(a) (West 1999); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (West 1999); 
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (West 1999); Emergency Planning and Community 
Right-To-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a) (West 1999). The Federal Insecticide, Fungi-
cide, Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136 (West 1999), however, does not contain a 
citizen suit provision. 
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civil action can be commenced against any person, including 
the United States, and any other governmental instrumental-
ity or agency to the extent permitted by the Eleventh Amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution.336 A citizen can also sue the 
Administrator where there is alleged a failure to perform any 
act or duty under the statute that is not discretionary.337 
As a jurisdictional requirement, most, if not all, federal en-
vironmental statutes require plaintiffs to give a notice of intent 
to sue.33S Furthermore, they generally provide that no action 
may be commenced prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has 
given notice of the alleged violation (1) to the Administrator, 
(2) to the State in which the alleged violation occurs, and (3) to 
any alleged violator of the statute.339 This provision is manda-
tory and failure to give notice, in the manner prescribed by the 
Administrator in the regulations,340 will lead to a dismissal.341 
The purpose of the sixty-day notice is to give the violator the 
opportunity to correct the violation, as well as to give the Ad-
ministrator the opportunity to enforce the statute using their 
resources.
342 If the Administrator or other federal or state 
authorities are "diligently prosecuting" the action, no citizen 
suit may be commenced, though citizens are authorized to in-
tervene in federal enforcement actions as a matter of right.343 
Consequently, the environmental justice advocate will need to 
336 See id. 
337 See id. (emphasis added). 
336 • See, e.g., TOXIC Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(b) (West 1999); Clean 
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (West 1999); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
300j-8(b) (West 1999); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b) (West 1999); 
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (West 1999); Emergency Planning and Community 
Right-To-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1l046(d) (West 1999). 
339 S id ee . 
340 See, e.g., Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(b)(2) (West 1999); Clean 
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(2) (West 1999); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
300j-8(b)(3) (West 1999); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(c) (West 1999); 
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(2) (West 1999); Emergency Planning andCommu-
nity Right-To-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1l046(d)(2) (West 1999). 
341 See Hallstrom v. Tillamook, 493 U.S. 20, 33 (1989). 
342 See id. at 29. 
343 See id. at 33 (emphasis added). 
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refer to the appropriate regulations to satisfy the notice re-
quirements. 
Typically, most environmental statutes provide that when-
ever on the basis of any information the Administrator deter-
mines that any person has violated or is in violation of any re-
quirement of the statute, the Administrator may either issue 
an order that assesses a civil penalty for any past or current 
violation and! or requires compliance immediately, or within a 
specified time period.344 Alternatively, the Administrator may 
commence a civil action in a United States district court in the 
district in which the violation occurred for appropriate relief, 
including a temporary or permanent injunction.345 The Admin-
istrator . can also seek criminal penalties against any person 
who knowingly or willfully violates the statute.346 Given the 
plethora of options, the government enforcement authorities 
enjoy considerable discretion in deciding whether or not to ini-
tiate enforcement proceedings and in choosing the type of en-
forcement action to initiate.347 Because judicial enforcement 
actions generally are more formal and more expensive, envi-
ronmental authorities usually go to court only to prosecute the 
most egregious violations. For example, in fiscal year 1997, 
EPA referred a total of 426 civil cases and 278 criminal cases 
to the Department of Justice for prosecution.348 If no enforce-
ment action is taken, however, within the sixty-day time pe-
riod, the environmental justice advocate can then file suit in 
federal district court. 
344 See, e.g., Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2615 (West 1999); Clean Wa· 
ter Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (West 1999); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300h-2 
(West 1999); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (West 1999); Clean Air Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 7613 (West 1999); Emergency pianning and Community Right-To-Know Act, 
42 U.S.C. §11045 (West 1999) (emphasis added). 
346 See id. 
346 See id. 
347 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 835 (1985). 
348 EPA, Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, Fiscal Year 1997 En-
forcement and Compliance Assurance Accomplishments Report (visited March 28, 
2000) <http://es.epa.gov/oeca/97accomp.pdf> (Table A-5. EPA Civil Referrals to the 
Department of Justice FY74 through FY97; Table A-4. EPA Criminal Enforcement 
FY83 through FY97). 
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B. GWALTNEY REQUIRES ONGOING VIOLATION 
In Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation,349 
environmental groups filed a claim in federal district court un-
der the Clean Water Act citizen suit provisions alleging that 
the permittee had violated and would continue to violate condi-
tions on the permit by exceeding effluent limitations on certain 
pollutants.35o The district court denied the permittee's motion 
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which was 
affirmed by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.351 The permit-
tee then petitioned for certiorari. The issue before the Supreme 
Court was whether the Clean Water Act confers federal juris-
diction over citizen suits for wholly past violations.352 
Underlying the Court's analysis is the principle that the 
objective of the Clean Water Act is "to restore and maintain 
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's 
waters.,,353 The Act thus makes it unlawful to discharge any 
pollutant into navigable waters except as authorized by stat-
ute.354 Pursuant to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimina-
tion System ("NPDES"),355 the Administrator may issue per-
mits authorizing the discharge of pollutants in accordance with 
specified conditions.356 The holder of a federal NPDES permit is 
then subject to enforcement action by the Administrator.357 Be-
tween 1981 and 1984, Gwaltney violated the conditions of its 
NPDES permits on numerous occasions by exceeding the efflu-
ent limitations on five of the seven pollutants covered.358 Dur-
ing this same period, however, Gwaltney installed new equip-
349 
484 u.s. 49 (1987). 
350 See id. at 54. 
351 
See id. at 56. 
352 
See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (West 1999). 353 [d. § 1251(a). 
354 See id. § 1311(a). 
355 
See id. § 1342. 
356 See id. § 1342(a). 
357 
See 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (West 1999). 
358 
See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 53. 
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ment that allowed the company to be in compliance with its 
NPDES permit for the first part of 1984.359 Nevertheless, in 
response to the violations, environmental groups filed suit af-
ter giving notice in June 1984 to the Administrator and the 
Virginia State Water Control Board.360 These groups alleged 
that the petitioner "has violated . . . [and] will continue to vio-
late its NPDES permit.,,361 
After a lengthy statutory interpretation of the citizen suit 
provision phrase "to be in violation," the Supreme Court con-
cluded, "citizens, unlike the Administrator, may seek civil pen-
alties only in a suit brought to enjoin or otherwise abate an 
ongoing violation. ,,362 In other words, the citizen suit provisions 
are "primarily forward looking,,,363 and "doD not permit citizen 
suits for wholly past violations.,,364 In line with this reasoning, 
the Court observed "the purpose of[the sixty-day] notice to the 
alleged violator is to give it an opportunity to bring itself into 
complete compliance with the Act and thus likewise render 
unnecessary a citizen suit.,,365 
Consequently, under the citizen suit provisions, a defendant 
can simply wait to the last minute to come into compliance 
with the permit. Since there is no ongoing violation, the case is 
dismissed as moot. As the Gwaltney Court recognized, 
"[l]ongstanding principles of mootness . . . prevent the mainte-
nance of suit when 'there is no reasonable expectation that the 
wrong will be repeated.',,366 Proving this expectation, however, 
is a "heavy one" because the defendant must demonstrate that 
it is "absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior 




362 Id. at 59 (emphasis added). 
363 
Gwaltrwy, 484 U.S. at 59. 
364 [d. at 64. 
365 [d. at 60. 
366 [d. at 66. 
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could not reasonably be expected to recur." 367 "Mere voluntary 
cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not moot a case; if it 
did, the courts would be compelled to leave '[t]he defendant ... 
free to return to his old ways.,,368 Moreover, in determining 
whether the defendant has met the burden, "[i]t is the duty of 
the courts to beware of efforts to defeat injunctive relief by 
protestations of repentance and reform, especially when aban-
donment seems timed to anticipate suit, and there is probabil-
ity of resumption. "aS9 The mootness doctrine should thus pro-
tect plaintiffs from defendants trying to circumvent statutory 
liability. 
C. BEYOND GWALTNEY 
On remand, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that citizen suits 
could be based on "a good faith allegation of ongoing violation," 
requiring proof of such violation at trial.370 This could be ac-
complished either "(1) by proving violations that continue on or 
after the date the complaint is filed, or (2) by adducing evi-
dence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find a con-
tinuing likelihood of a recurrence in intermittent or sporadic 
violations."a71 With these instructions, the Fourth Circuit re-
manded the case to the district court, which found that al-
though the violations had not continued, at the time the suit 
was filed "there existed a very real danger and likelihood of 
further violation. "a72 The district court then reinstated the en-
tire judgment against Gwaltney.373 Gwaltney again appealed to 
367 [d. (emphasis in original). 
368 United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n., 393 U.S. 199, 203 
(1968) (citing Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 66). 
369 United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc., 343 U.S. 326, 333 (1952) (citing 
Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 66). 
370 . . Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Gwaltney of Srmthfield, Ltd., 844 F.2d 170, 171 
(4th Cir. 1988). 371 See [d. at 171-72. 
372 Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 688 F.Supp. 1078, 
1079 (E.D. Va. 1988). 
373 See id. at 1080. 
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the Fourth Circuit, which affirmed the trial courts 
conclusions.374 In doing so, the court held that regardless of 
subsequent events, because there was an ongoing violation 
when the suit was filed and because "a suit seeking penalties is 
intrinsically incapable of being rendered moot by the polluter's 
corrective actions" the case was not moot.375 
D.SUMMARY 
The citizen suit prOVISIons of the federal environmental 
statutes provide the environmental justice advocate with an 
enforcement tool for ongoing violations of federal law. If a citi-
zen suit is headed for mootness, the environmental justice ad-
vocate would be wise to invite the Administrator of the EPA to 
join in the lawsuit, as this would assure standing as well as 
provide penalties going to the United States Treasury for the 
past violations. Even if not invited, under most citizen suit 
provisions, the Administrator may intervene as a matter of 
. ht 376 ng . 
If a defendant clearly abates the violation prior to trial, the 
environmental justice advocate will have succeeded in elimi-
nating an environmental harm, even if the abatement could 
have occurred sooner. In this situation, the environmental jus-
tice advocate should be able to recover litigation costs, includ-
ing reasonable attorney and expert witness fees. 377 The legisla-
tive history of the costs of litigation section in virtually all citi-
374 Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 890 F.2d 690 (4th 
Cir.1989). 
375 
Id. at 696. 
376 See, e.g., Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(c)(1) (West 1999); Clean 
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2) (West 1999); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
30Oj-8(c) (West 1999); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(d) (West 1999); 
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(c)(2) (West 1999); Emergency Planning and C!lmmu-
nity Right-To-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11046(h)(l) (West 1999). 
377 See, e.g., Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(c)(2) (West 1999); Clean 
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (West 1999); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
30Oj-8(d) (West 1999); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (West 1999); 
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (West 1999); Emergency Planning and Community 
Right-To-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11046(0 (West 1999). 
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zen suit statutes recognizes that the award of costs "should 
extend to plaintiffs in actions, which result in successful 
abatement but do not reach a verdict. ,,378 
V. PROCEDURAL ISSUES IN FILING CLAIMS UNDER THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION CLAUSE, TITLE VI, AND FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
STATUTES 
Whether an environmental justice advocate files a civil ac-
tion under the Equal Protection Clause or Title VI, the chal-
lenge will be the same: proving discriminatory intent. How-
ever, while the Equal Protection Clause will be available for 
cases where the government actor is not receiving federal 
funds, Title VI will only be available when federal funds are 
being received. A citizen suit filed under the federal environ-
mental statutes creates its own unique challenges. Regardless, 
bringing the case before a jury will provide the environmental 
justice advocate with the best chance of success. 
A. JURISDICTION 
1. Under the Equal Protection Clause 
Under a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection chal-
lenge,S79 subject matter jurisdiction will be found at 28 U.S.C. § 
1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 
1983 creates a mechanism for recovering both monetary dam-
ages and injunctive relief from governmental actors and enti-
ties whose actions under "color of' state or local law deprive a 
plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the 
United States Constitution or federal statutes.380 Thus, "[t]he 
378 Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 67 n.6. But see Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111 (1992) 
(explaining that "to qualify as a prevailing party, a civil rights plaintiff must obtain at 
least some relief on the merits of his claim"). 379 
An equal protection challenge can also be maintained against a federal agency 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
380 Section 1983 provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
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purpose of section 1983 is to deter state actors from using the 
badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their feder-
ally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such 
deterrence fails.,,381 Section 1983, however, " 'is not itself a 
source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for 
vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.' ,,382 Neverthe-
less, the Supreme Court has held that "[a] broad construction 
of section 1983 is compelled by the statutory language, which 
speaks of deprivations of 'any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the constitution and laws.' Accordingly, 'we have 
repeatedly held that the coverage of [section 1983] must be 
broadly construed.,,,s83 
2. Under Federal Statutes 
In Maine v. Thiboutot,384 the Court ruled that parties may 
rely upon section 1983 to challenge violations of federal stat-
utes as well as constitutionallaw.385 "[U]nder section 1983 state 
'officers may be made to respond in damages not only for viola-
tions of rights conferred by federal equal civil rights law, but 
for violations of other federal constitutional and statutory 
rights as well.' ,,386 However, not all violations of a federal stat-
ute give rise to section 1983 actions. 387 "A plaintiff alleging a 
violation of a federal statute will be permitted to sue under 
section 1983 unless 'the statute [does] not create enforceable 
rights, privileges, or immunities within the meaning of [sec-
8ubject8, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, 
or other proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
381 Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992). 
382 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). 
383 Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 443 (1991). 
384 448 U.S. 1 (1980). 
385 See id. at 4 (emphasis added). 
3S6 [d. (emphasis added). 
387 . Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 355-356 (1992). 
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tion] 1983,' or unless 'Congress has foreclosed such enforce-
ment of the statute in the enactment itself.' ,,388 
With regard to this second section 1983 limitation, "[t]he 
burden is on the State to show 'by express provision or other 
specific evidence from the statute itself that congress intended 
to foreclose such private enforcement.m389 The Court in Mid-
dlesex City Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers,390 
found such foreclosure because of the comprehensiveness of the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act's enforcement scheme, 
which granted EPA substantial power to use of noncompliance 
orders, civil suits, and criminal penalties to enforce its provi-
sions.391 The Court in Sea Clammers also held that even though 
most federal environmental citizen suit provisions contain 
savings clauses,392 which generally provide that nothing in the 
citizen suit provision "shall restrict any right which any person 
... may have under any statute or common law or to seek ... 
any other relief," the express remedies provided in the federal 
environmental statutes "preclude suits for damages under [sec-
tion] 1983, and that the saving clauses do not require a con-
l . ,,393 trary conc US1,On. 
The reach of the Sea Clammers decision, however, is nar-
row. One reason is that the cases in which congressional intent 
is found to foreclose a section 1983 remedy are "exceptional." 
Accordingly, section 1983 "remains a generally and presump-
tively available remedy for claimed violations of federal law .,,3IM 
Another reason is because the decision does not "stand for the 
388 Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n., 496 U.S. 49B, 50B (1990). 
389 ld. at 520-521. 
390 453 U.S. 1 (19B1). 
391. . . See id. at 13 (Clting 33 U.S.C. § 1251). 
392 . See, e.g., ToXIC Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (West 1999); Clean Wa-
ter Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (West 1999); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-B 
(West 1999); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (West 1999); Clean Air Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 7604 (West 1999); Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 11046 (West 1999). 
393 Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 30 n.31 (emphasis added). 
31M •• LiVldas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107,133 (1994). 
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proposition that a federal statutory scheme can preempt inde-
pendently existing constitutional rights, which have contours 
distinct from the statutory claim;" rather, it "speaks only to 
whether federal statutory rights can be enforced both through 
the statute itself and through section 1983.,,395 Consequently, 
there is nothing in the holding of Sea Clammers to suggest 
that an environmental justice advocate could not file a section 
1983 civil action under the Equal Protection Clause or Title VI 
for intentional discrimination. There is also nothing in Sea 
Clammers to suggest that the advocate could not file an ad-
ministrative complaint under Title VI regulations for state ac-
tions that have a disparate impact on communities of color. 
Instead, See Clammers only limits the availability of the dam-
ages component of a section 1983 remedy under federal envi-
ronmental statute enforcement proceedings. Remedies will, 
therefore, be limited to the specific relief available under the 
various citizen suit provisions. 
Sea Clammers' decision regarding the relief available under 
the savings clause was revisited in the subsequent case of In-
ternational Paper Co. v. Ouellette.396 In this case, the Court 
held that the savings clause in the Clean Water Act,397 allows 
state law actions against water pollution notwithstanding the 
existence of federal law and standards.896 In so holding, the 
Court reasoned that the savings clause "negates the inference 
that congress 'left no room' for state causes of action;,,399 rather 
it "specifically preserves other state actions, and therefore 
nothing in the Act bars aggrieved individuals from bringing a 
nuisance claim pursuant to the law of the source State.,,400 
895 Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1233 (lOth Cir. 1996). 
396 479 U.S. 481(1987). 
397 See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e). 
398 
See International Paper Co., 479 U.S. at 497. 
399 Id. at 492 (emphasis added). 
400 Id. at 496 (emphasis added). 
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3. Under Title VI 
As in a section 1983 challenge, damages, as well as injunc-
tive relief, will be available under a Title VI intentional dis-
crimination case. For these cases, however, the "reach of Title 
VI's protection extends no further than the Fourteenth 
Amendment.'",o1 Thus, jurisdiction for a Title VI challenge, 
found at 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(4), and 42 
U.S.C. § 2000d, will be judicially implied under the holding in 
Guardians only when a plaintiff has alleged an intentional dis-
crimination. 
Once this is met, under Title VI EPA regulations, an ad-
ministrative complaint can be filed under Title 40, section 
7.120 of the Code of Federal Regulations or under EPA's Final 
Guidance, assuming they have been implemented. Judicial re-
view of the agency determination on this administrative com-
plaint can be immediate if the agency action, or inaction, en-
dangers public health or safety, or after a final decision has 
been rendered if brought under the AP A. Relief under the 
APA, however, will be limited to injunctive relief.402 
4. State Court Jurisdiction 
Most state courts are courts of general jurisdiction. There-
fore, state courts have subject matter jurisdiction over any 
cognizable claim, including state and federal question cases, 
except for certain federal question cases in which the federal 
district courts have exclusive jurisdiction. For example, federal 
courts would have exclusive jurisdiction over admiralty, bank-
ruptcy, and patent cases.403 Any doubt that a state court could 
entertain such actions was dispelled by the Supreme Court in 
Martinez v. California.404 In that case, although the Court did 
not answer the question of whether state courts were obligated 
401 U.S. v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 732 n.7 (1992). 
402 
See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (West 1999). 
403 
28 U.S.C. § 1333 (West 1999); 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (West 1999); 28 U.S.C. § 1338 
(West 1999). 
404 444 U.S. 277 (1980). 
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to entertain section 1983 actions, it held that "Congress has 
not barred them from doing SO.,,405 Consequently, in Maine v. 
Thiboutot,406 the plaintiffs "exhausted their state administra-
tive remedies and then sought judicial review of the adminis-
trative action in the state superior court. By amended com-
plaint, respondents also claimed relief under [section] 1983 for 
themselves and others similarly situated.,,407 There is nothing 
in the case law to suggest that an environmental justice advo-
cate could not maintain, in a State Superior Court, an Equal 
Protection Challenge under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a Title VI inten-
tional discrimination suit under 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, a Review of 
Title VI administrative complaint under 5 U.S.C. § 702 or any 
claims under the various federal environmental statute citizen 
suit provisions. The advocate should thus consider whether 
there would be any advantages to filing the environmental jus-
tice case in state court. 
B. STANDING 
In Arlington Heights, the Court considered the plaintiffs' 
standing to bring the suit and found that, in a constitutional 
setting, the issue is "whether the plaintiff has alleged such a 
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy [as] to war-
rant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify 
exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf.,,408 In ad-
dition, the plaintiff must show that he is personally injured by 
the challenged action of the defendant.409 The injury, however, 
may be indirect, but the complaint must indicate that the in-
jury is indeed fairly traceable to defendant's acts or 
omissions.41o Finally, the Court concluded that the plaintiff had 
405 Maine, 448 U.S. at 3 n. 1 (citing Martinez, 444 U.S. at 283-284, n. 7). 
406 
448 U.S. 1 (1980). 
407 [d. at 3. 
408 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 
261 (1977). 
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to show an injury that is "likely to be redressed by a favorable 
d .. ,,411 eClSlon. 
In Steel Co. v. Citizens for A Better Environment,412 the 
Court reiterated the three constitutional requirements that 
comprise the core of Article Ill's case-or-controversy require-
ment: (1) an injury in fact; (2) causation; and (3) 
redressability.413 The advocate must satisfy the standing re-
quirements before proceeding with an environmental justice 
case. Moreover, these requirements must continue to exist at 
every stage of review, not merely at the time of the filing of the 
complaint.414 If the plaintiffs fail to satisfy an element of 
standing at any point, the action becomes moot.416 
In Steel Co., an environmental group brought a civil action 
against a steel manufacturer under the Federal Environmental 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 
1986 ("EPCRA").416 Under this statute, civil penalties, author-
ized as damages, are payable to the United States Treasury.417 
Consequently, the Court concluded that "the complaint fails 
the third test of standing, redressability,"'IS because a damages 
remedy paid to the Treasury will not redress the plaintiffs' in-
juries, assuming the plaintiffs' could assert an injury in fact in 
the first place. Had plaintiffs alleged a "continuing or immi-
nent violation" of EPCRA, however, "the requested injunctive 
relief may well have redressed the asserted injury.,,419 In other 
words, civil actions brought under federal environmental stat-
utes, which only allow for penalties payable to the Treasury, 
cannot be maintained unless the plaintiff can allege a con-
411 [d. at 262. 
412 523 U.s. 83 (1998). 
413 
See id. at 103. 
414 
See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997). 
416 
See United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980). 
416 
42 U.S.C. §§ 11001 to 11050 (West 1999). 
417 
See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 106. See also 42 U.S.C. § 11045(c) (West 1999). 
41S [d. 
419 [d. at 110 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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tinuing or imminent violation of the statute. Thus, Steel Co. 
merely reaffirms Gwaltney's ongoing violation requirement. 
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Serv-
ices, Inc. 420 also reaffirms Gwaltney's holding. In Friends of the 
Earth, Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. ("Laidlaw") 
owned and operated a hazardous waste incinerator located in 
Roebuck, South Carolina.421 As part of that facility, Laidlaw 
maintained a wastewater treatment plant for water used in air 
pollution control devices for the incinerator.422 Laidlaw dis-
charged that treated wastewater into the North Tyger River 
pursuant to a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Sys-
tem ("NPDES") permit issued by the South Carolina Depart-
ment of Health and Environmental Control. 423 This permit re-
quired the defendant to monitor and report their discharges 
through, for example, discharge monitoring reports ("DMRs") 
and laboratory reports.424 The plaintiffs filed suit under the 
citizen suit provisions of the Clean Water Act on June 12, 
1992, alleging discharges in excess of the permit limits.425 Al-
though Laidlaw moved to dismiss on July 1, 1992, its motion 
was denied.425 In May 1995, the parties filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment.427 On June 27, 1995 the district court de-
nied plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and 
granted, in part, Laidlaw's motion with regard to eftluent dis-
charge violations other than mercury, citing Gwaltney v. 
Chesapeake Bay Founation, Inc.423 Thus, the only issue before 
the district court was the mercury violations, as these were 
420 956 F. Supp. 588 (D. S.C. 1997) rev'd ,120 S.Ct. 693 (2000). 
421 





424 . • See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 890 F. Supp. 470, 475 
(D.S.C. 1995). 
425 
See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 956 F. Supp. 588, 592 
(D.S.C. 1997). See also 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (West 1999). 
426 
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ostensibly ongoing at the time the lawsuit was filed on June 
12, 1992.429 
In awarding civil penalties against Laidlaw, the district 
court correctly reasoned that section 309(d) mandates a civil 
penalty once a violation is established.430 The court then went 
on to assess a penalty of $405,800 for the 475 pre-complaint 
mercury exceedance violations and 14 post-complaint viola-
tions:31 the 419 pre-complaint monitoring violations with only 
one alleged post-complaint monitoring violation; and the 503 
pre-complaint reporting violations with zero post-complaint 
reporting violations.432 Under Gwaltney, however, the district 
court clearly erred in assessing penalties for the 475 past mer-
cury violations and the 503 past reporting violations because in 
Gwaltney, the Supreme Court had concluded, "citizens, unlike 
the Administrator, may seek civil penalties only in a suit 
brought to enjoin or otherwise abate an ongoing violation.,,433 
Since the Administrator was not a party to the citizen suit, the 
district court clearly exceeded its jurisdiction in awarding pen-
alties for the past violations. Under the district court's calcula-
tions, the proper penalty assessed Laidlaw for the post-
complaint violations should have been $15,100, not $405,800.434 
At this point, Laidlaw should have moved for a dismissal of 
the case as being moot under Gwaltney, since Laidlaw could 
have demonstrated "that it is 'absolutely clear that the alleg-
edly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to 
recur.' ,,435 The district court recognized that Laidlaw's "compli-
429 See id. 
430 See Laidlaw, 956 F. Supp. at 601 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d); 1365(a». 
431 Eleven violations occurred between June 12, 1992 and October 1992. Each year 
thereafter, in 1993, 1995 and 1995, there was only one exceedance annually. See id. at 
600. 
432 
See [d. at 600,609-10. 
433 • Gwaltney of SIIl1thfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 59 (1987) (em-
phasis added). 
434 See Laidlaw, 956 F. Supp. at 610 and 621. There is one monitoring violation at 
$100 and fourteen exceedance violations at $15,000. [d. 
435 Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 66 (emphasis in original). 
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ance history demonstrates that Laidlaw's efforts have remedied 
its compliance problem.,,436 Moreover, the district court stated 
that "Laidlaw has been in substantial compliance with all pa-
rameters in its NPDES permit since at least August 1992," 
including the discharge levels for all metals, temperature, pH 
and all monitoring and reporting obligations.437 "In fact, Laid-
law has been in compliance with the vast majority of its permit 
requirements for a much longer period of time, extending back 
to March 1991 when the [metals removal] system was in-
stalled.,,436 After Laidlaw failed to do so, however, the district 
court concluded that "[t]he lack of demonstrated harm and the 
fact that Laidlaw is now and has for an extended period of time 
been in compliance with its permit compels the conclusion that 
no injunction or other form of equitable relief is appropriate. 
Accordingly, plaintiffs' request for equitable reliefis denied.,,439 
Apparently not satisfied with the penalties assessed against 
Laidlaw, the plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the district court abused its 
discretion by ordering an inadequate penalty.«O The Fourth 
Circuit concluded, however, that because the plaintiffs did not 
appeal the "denial of declaratory and injunctive relief, the only 
potential relief that may be available to redress their claimed 
injuries is the civil penalty imposed upon Laidlaw, which 
would be paid to the United States Treasury.,,441 Accordingly, 
under Steel Co., which held that civil penalties do not confer 
standing to prosecute a private enforcement action under the 
citizen-suit provisions because it could not redress the injury 
plaintiff had allegedly suffered, the court concluded that the 
486 Laidlaw, 956 F. Supp. at 609 (emphasis added), 
437 
Ill. at 611. 
486 Ill. 
439 Id. In a separate order, the court stayed the time for a petition for attorney's 
fees until the time for appeal had expired or, if either party appealed, until the appeal 
was resolved. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 149 F.3d 303, 
305 (4th eir. 1998). 
«0 See Laidlaw, 149 F.3d at 305. 
441 
Ill. at 306. 
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action was moot.442 The Fourth Circuit, therefore, vacated the 
district court's order and remanded with instructions to dis-
miss.443 Consequently, not only did Laidlaw avoid $405)800 in 
penalties, but "[p]laintiffs' failure to obtain relief on the merits 
of their claims preclude[d] any recovery of attorney's fees or 
other litigation costs because such an award is available only 
to a 'prevailing or substantially prevailing party.',,444 
The plaintiffs again appealed the decision and the Supreme 
Court reversed, concluding that the Fourth Circuit erred when 
it dismissed the suit as moot.440 In doing so the Court stated, 
"[i]n directing dismissal of the suit on grounds of mootness, the 
Court of Appeals incorrectly conflated Supreme Court case law 
on initial standing to bring suit, with the Court's case law on 
post-commencement mootness." 440 On the initial standing is-
sue, the court discussed the redressability requirement, the 
Court observed: 
[T]he civil penalties sought by [the plaintiffs] carried 
with them a deterrent effect that made it likely, as op-
posed to merely speculative, that the penalties would 
redress [plaintiff's] injuries by abating current viola-
tions and preventing future ones - - as the District 
442 
See id. See also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998). 
443 . Laidlaw, 149 F.3d at 306. 
444 [d. at 307 n.5; 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (West 1999). 
445 
See Laidlaw, 120 S.Ct. 693, 700 (2000). 
440 See id. (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998); City of 
Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982». In addressing the question of 
mootness, the Court stated, "[i]t is well settled that 'a defendant's voluntary cessation 
of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the 
legality of the practice.''' Laidlaw, 120 S. Ct. at 708 (quoting City of Mesquite, 455 
U.S. at 289). Furthermore, the defendant that claims voluntary cessation as a way to 
mootness "bears the formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely clear [that] the 
allegedly wrongful behavior could not be reasonably expected to recur." [d. at 709. 
Consequently, the Court held that Laidlaw's claims for mootness from shutting down 
the Roebuck facility and from its substantial compliance earlier, as far as they meet 
the above burden, is a "disputed factual matter ... [and] remain[s] open for considera-
tion on remand." [d. at 711. 
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Court reasonably found when it assessed a penalty of 
$405,800.447 
The Supreme Court's observation, however, ignores the fact 
that only $15,100 of the assessed penalty is for current viola-
tions. Moreover, while the district court can consider the "his-
tory of such violations" for purposes of assessing a current 
penalty, there is no statutory authority for the court to assess 
penalties for past violations under the citizen suit provisions.448 
Nevertheless the Supreme Court, in Laidlaw, clarified its 
holding in Steel Co. by recognizing that while "Steel Co. held 
that private plaintiffs, unlike the Federal Government, may 
not sue to assess penalties for wholly past violations," Steel Co. 
did not address the issue of whether a private plaintiff had 
"standing to seek penalties for violations that are ongoing at 
the time of the complaint and that could continue into the fu-
ture if undeterred.~9 As the dissent correctly observed, the 
Laidlaw Court thus held "that a penalty payable to the public 
"remedies" a threatened private harm, and suffices to sustain a 
private suit."'50 Not surprisingly, Laidlaw merely reaffirms 
Gwaltney for the holding that "citizens, unlike the Administra-
tor, may seek civil penalties only in a suit brought to enjoin or 
otherwise abate an ongoing violation.,,451 
On remand, Laidlaw will likely challenge the district court's 
subject-matter jurisdiction to award penalties for the past vio-
447 
Id. at 707 (citing Laidlaw, 956 F. Supp. at 610-11). 
448 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (West 1999). "In determining the amount of a civil penalty 
the court shall consider the seriousness of the violation or violations, the economic 
benefit (if any) resulting from the violation, any history of such violations, any good-
faith efforts to comply with the applicable requirements, the economic impact of the 
penalty on the violator, and such other matters as justice may require." Id. But see 
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Texaco, 2 F.3d 493,503 (3d Cir. 1993) (once 
citizen plaintiff establishes ongoing violation of parameter at time complaint is filed, 
court is obliged to aSBeSS penalties for all proven violations of that parameter) (empha-
sis added). 
449 
Laidlaw, 120 S.Ct. at 708. 
450 
Id. at 715 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
451 
Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 59 (emphasis added). 
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lations under the citizen suit provisions. "Without jurisdiction 
the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is 
power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only 
function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact 
and dismissing the cause. ,,452 Subject-matter jurisdiction would 
exist, however, for the post-complaint violations and penalty 
assessment of $15,100. Moreover, it would behoove the Ad-
ministrator to intervene to preserve the penalties assessed for 
Laidlaw's wholly past violations.453 
Had Laidlaw been brought under the Clean Air Act, the 
Court might not have had the opportunity to address the civil 
penalties issue. Under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1990, penalties, instead of going to the United States Treasury, 
"shall be deposited in a special fund in the United States 
Treasury for licensing and other services.,,454 More signifi-
cantly, the district court in any citizen suit shall have discre-
tion to order that such civil penalties, in lieu of being deposited 
in the special fund, "be used in beneficial mitigation projects 
which are consistent with this chapter and enhance the public 
health or the environment. ,,455 In such situations, a damages 
remedy is not paid entirely to the Treasury. Consequently, not 
only will the mitigation projects redress the plaintiffs' injuries, 
but will render the Article III standing limitations asserted in 
Steel Co. inapplicable to Clean Air Act citizen suits. The 1990 
Amendments to the Clean Air Act have thus essentially satis-
fied Steel Co.'s redressability requirement. 
Additionally, under the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air 
Act, citizen suits can now be maintained for wholly past viola-
452 Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83, 94 (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1869». 
453 See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2) (West 1999). In such action under this section, the 
Administrator, if not a party, may intervene as a matter of right. See id. 454 42 U.S.C. § 7604(g)(1) (West 1999). 
455 
42 U.S.C. § 7604(g)(2) (West 1999). The court shall obtain the view of the Ad-
ministrator in exercising such discretion and selecting any such projects. The amount 
of any such payment in any such action shall not exceed $100,000. See id. 
70
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2000], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol30/iss3/2
2000] ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 449 
tions that have occurred more than once.456 Any limitations 
imposed by Gwaltney, Steel Co., or Laidlaw, thus will not ap-
ply to citizen suits under the Clean Air Act. If Congress were 
so inclined, it could craft similar language into all environ-
mental citizen suit statutes to allow suits for wholly past viola-
tions that have occurred more that once, as well as incorpo-
rating mitigation projects into the other citizen suit provisions. 
C. STATING A CLAIM 
Under an equal protection environmental justice claim, to 
state a cause of action under section 1983, the plaintiff must 
allege that some person, acting under state or territorial law, 
has deprived him of a federal right.457 Presumably, the advo-
cate will allege discriminatory intent on the part of the defen-
dants, as this element will need to be proven at trial. Simi-
larly, under Title VI "[t]o state a claim for damages under 42 
U.S.C. § 2000d, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the entity in-
volved is engaging in racial discrimination; and (2) the entity 
involved is receiving federal assistance. ,,458 "Although the 
plaintiff must prove intent at trial, it need not be pled in the 
complaint. ,,459 
Under the citizen suit provisions, the plaintiff will need to 
allege "a state of either continuous or intermittent violation; 
that is, a reasonable likelihood that a past polluter will con-
456 42 U.S.C. § 7604(aXl) (West 1999). A civil action may be brought against any 
person "who is alleged to have violated (if there is evidence that the alleged violation 
has been repeated)." [d. See also Fried v. Sungard Recovery Services, Inc. 916 F. 
Supp. 465, 467 (E.n. Pa. 1996). "A plain reading of the CAA as amended, however, 
indicates that the 1990 Amendments overruled Gwaltney with respect to wholly past 
violations. The CAA, therefore, permits citizen suits for both continuing violations and 
wholly past violation, 80 long as the past violation occurred more than once." [d. 
457 
See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). 
456 Fobbs v. Holy Cross Health System Corp., 29 F.3d 1439, 1447 (9th Cir. 1994), 
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tinue to pollute in the future.,,460 Under the federal laws, a 
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim 
"unless it appears beyond doubt that "the plaintiff can prove no 
set of facts" in support of the claim.461 For example, in Scheuer 
v. Rhodes,462 the Court held that for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion, the allegations in the complaint are taken as true, 
even when they "have not yet [been] established by proof.,,463 
Thus, an environmental justice claim should withstand a mo-
tion to dismiss if properly pled because even defective allega-
tions in a complaint can be amended to correct any pleading 
errors. 464 
D. TIMELY FILING 
The advocate should file the case within the applicable 
statute of limitations. For an equal protection challenge filed 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to the limitations period is 
the one found in the particular state's personal-injury 
statute.465 For claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, a num-
ber of circuit courts have held that such claims brought are 
governed by the same state limitations period.466 Consequently, 
the state in which an equal protection challenge or Title VI 
action is filed will govern the time within which to file the ac-
tion. A Title VI administrative complaint, however, "must be 
filed within 180 calendar days of the alleged discriminatory 
460 Gwaltney, 484 u.s. at 57. Section "505 confers jurisdiction over citizen suits 
when the citizen-plaintiffs make a good-faith allegation of continuous or intermittent 
violation." [d. at 64. 
461 • Conley v. GIbson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-6 (1957). 
462 416 U.S. 232 (1974). 
463 [d. at 238. 
464 
See FED. R. Crv. P. 15(a); 28 U.S.C.A § 1653 (West 1999). 
465 Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261,276 (1985). 
466 See Taylor v. Regents ofUniv. of Cal., 993 F.2d 710, 712 (9th Cir. 1993); Frazier 
v. Garrison I.S.C., 980 F.2d 1514, 1520-22 (5th Cir. 1993); Bougher v. University of 
Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74, 77-78 (3d Cir. 1989); Chambers v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 536 
F.2d 222, 225 n.2 (8th Cir. 1976). 
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acts, unless the OCR waives the time limit for good cause.,,467 
With regard to a complaint under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, numerous courts have held that it is a "civil action" 
within the meaning of the Tucker Act,468 which contains the 
general six-year statute of limitations. 
E.S~YJUDGMENT 
An environmental justice action filed under either the 
Equal Protection Clause or Title VI should withstand a defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment. The reason for this is 
that in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, the Court recognized that "the 
plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary 
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, 
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to es-
tablish the existence of an element essential to that party's 
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at 
trial.,,469 "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute 
between the parties will [thus] not defeat an otherwise prop-
erly supported motion for summary judgment [since] the re-
quirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact. ,,470 
A fact is material when it is identified as such by the control-
ling substantive law.471 In an environmental justice case, 
"whether the differential impact ... reflect[s] an intent to dis-
criminate on account of race, . . . is a pure question of fact.,,472 
Similarly, an issue is genuine when the evidence is such that a 
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant.473 
Accordingly, the nonmovant "must do more than simply show 
467 40 C.F.R. § 7.120(bX2) (1999). 
468 28 U.S.C. § 1491. "[E]very civil action commenced against the United States 
shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action 
first accrues." 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (West 1999). See also Sierra Club v. Slater, 120 F.3d 
623, 630-31 (6th Cir. 1997). 
469 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 47 U.S. 317,322 (1986) (emphasis added). 
470 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,247-48 (1986) (emphasis added). 
471 S id ee . at 248. 
472 Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287-88 (1982). 
473 See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50. 
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that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . 
. . [for w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a ra-
tional trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 
'genuine issue for trial.' ,,474 
Thus, to survive a motion for summary judgment, the advo-
cate, after discovery, must come forward with specific evidence 
of every element material to the case so as to create a genuine 
issue for trial. The evidence of disparate impact, together with 
supplemental circumstantial evidence should create this 
genuine issue of material fact for the trial court. For example, 
in R.l.S.E. Inc. v. Kay;76 the evidence of disproportionate im-
pact on black residents by the placement of landfills in King 
and Queen County for twenty-five years beginning in 1969, 
together with the historical facts revealing a pattern of official 
actions taken for invidious purposes, could lead a rational trier 
of fact to the conclusion that there was a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause.476 
F. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
In general, government defendants do not like to be sued. 
Thus, in an environmental justice action under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, the government defendants will most likely 
assert sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. 
While it is clear that the Eleventh Amendment will bar a dam-
ages claim against state officials sued in their official capacity, 
it will not, however, bar a damages claim against state officials 
sued in their personal capacity.477 When this is done, state offi-
cials can assert "personal immunity defenses, s:uch as objec-
tively reasonable reliance on existing law.,,478 However, while 
474 Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 
(1986). 476 
768 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Va. 1991), affd without opinion, 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 
1992). 
476 S id. ee at 1143. 
477 
See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). 
478 
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1985). 
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most public officials are entitled to assert qualified immunity 
as a personal, affirmative defense to a damage liability, it does 
not bar actions for declaratory or injunctive relief. ,,479 
In an official capacity, however, the Supreme Court has 
held, in Kentucky v. Graham,48O that "personal immunity de-
fenses are unavailable. [Consequently, t]he only immunities 
that can be claimed ... are forms of sovereign immunity that 
the entity, qua entity, may possess, such as the Eleventh 
Amendment.,,481 Similarly, in Howlett v. Rose,482 the Court rec-
ognized that "since municipal corporations and similar gov-
ernmental entities are 'persons,' . . . a state court entertaining 
a [section] 1983 action ... [has] abolished whatever vestige of 
the State's sovereign immunity the municipality possessed.,,4i13 
Thus, the County Board of Supervisors of San Franjustco 
County484 could be sued in an official-capacity action filed un-
der section 1983. Local government officials are also "persons" 
under section 1983 when sued in their official capacities. As 
such, they are suable in those cases in which the local govern-
ment would be suable it its own name.485 Consequently, local 
governments and their officials "can be sued directly under 
[section] 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief 
where, as here, the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional 
implements a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or deci-
sion officially adopted and promulgated by that body's 
officers.,,486 In the hypothetical, then, San Franjustco County 
could be sued in its own name for monetary, declaratory, or 
injunctive relief because the municipality is a "person" under 
section 1983. Moreover, San Franjustco County could not as-
479 
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806-807 (1982). 
480 473 U.S. 159 (1985). 
481 ld. at 167. 
482 496 U.S. 356 (1990). 
483 ld. at 376. 
484 See supra notes 171-174 and accompanying text for examples. 
485 See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 
(1978). 
486 ld. at 690. 
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sert any sovereign immunity defense because "[t]he bar of the 
Eleventh Amendment to suit in federal courts ... does not ex-
tend to counties and similar municipal corporations.,,487 
The major distinction of an environmental justice claim 
filed under Title VI, as opposed to section 1983, is that Con-
gress explicitly abrogated the states' immunity from suits in 
federal court alleging violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964.488 Significantly, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(2) provides, 
In a suit against a State for a violation of a statute re-
ferred to in paragraph (1), remedies (including remedies 
both at law and in equity) are available for such a viola-
tion to the same extent as such remedies are available 
for such a violation in the suit against any public or pri-
vate entity other than ~ State.489 
Such an abrogation of a state's Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity "similarly precludes assertion of immunity by state offi-
cials sued in their official capacity."'oo The Eleventh Amend-
ment is thus not a bar to a private cause of action for damages, 
as well as declaratory and injunctive relief, under a Title VI 
suit, against state and local agencies receiving federal funds. 
Such remedies could compensate a minority community for 
decreased land values, aesthetics, and the risks to the health 
and safety of its inhabitants.491 
G. EQUITABLE RELIEF 
Equitable claims are generally decided by the district court. 
However, "when both parties consent, [Federal Rule of Civil 
487 Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977). 
488 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d-7(a)(1) (West 1999) (added by the Rehabilitation Act 
Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. 99-506, 100 Stat. 1845 (1986». 
489 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(2). 
490 
Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 447, 452 n.4 (9th Cir. 1996). 
491 
See Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 677, affd without opinion, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 
1986). 
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Procedure ("FRCP")] 39(c) invests the trial court with the dis-
cretion - - but not the duty - - to submit an equitable claim to 
the jury for a binding verdict. ",,92 As the Supreme Court has 
recognized the legal action for a damages remedy under the 
Equal Protection Clause493 and Title VI,494 the advocate should 
demand a jury trial on the issue of discriminatory intent. This 
demand is an affirmative duty as, established by FRCP 38(b), 
thus, "the failure to file a demand constitutes a waiver of the 
right.""96 Such a demand was made in Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. 
Westover, where the Supreme Court held that, per the FRCP, 
the same court may try both legal and equitable causes in the 
same action .... Whatever permanent injunctive relief [the 
plaintiffs] might be entitled to on the basis of the decision in 
this case could, of course, be given by the court after the jury 
renders its verdict.""96 This allows all issues between two par-
ties to be fully settled by a jury in a single suit!97 The envi-
ronmental justice advocate thus is entitled to a jury trial on 
the issue of intent under the Equal Protection Clause and Title 
VI. Injunctive relief, however, should await determination of 
the legal issues. 
H. ATrORNEY FEES 
Under section 1983 or Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides, 
in part, that in an enforcement of a section 1983 violation, 
brought by or on behalf of the government, or in an enforce-
ment or charge of a Title VI violation, "the court in its discre-
tion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United 
492 Merex A.G. v. Fairchild Weston Sys., Inc., 29 F.3d 821, 827 (2d Cir. 1994). 
493 See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). 
494 See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 70 (1992). See also 
Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 191 (1996) (citing Franklin for the interpretation that a 
"clear ml\iority" of the Court in Guardians confirmed that damages were available for 
intentional violations of Title VI). 
496 See Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1530-31 (9th Cir. 1995). 
496 
Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 508 (1959) (emphasis added). 
497 See id. 
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States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costS.,,498 Sec-
tion 1988 would thus seem to include fees under Title VI ad- . 
ministrative proceedings as well. In comparison, attorney fees 
under the federal environmental statutes are authorized under 
the various citizen suit provisions.499 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Environmental justice cases alleging purposeful discrimina-
tion must be tried before a jury. A jury composed of a represen-
tative community of color will see to it that no subgroup of 
people should be forced to shoulder a disproportionate share of 
the negative environmental impacts of pollution or environ-
mental hazards due to lack of political or economic strength. In 
a purposeful discrimination case, Title VI should prove to be a 
slightly better vehicle than section 1983, as Congress has ex-
pressly abrogated the states Eleventh Amendment immunity. 
Under Title VI and section 1983, damages, as well as injunc-
tive relief, should be sought. 
Under Title VI regulations, the environmental justice advo-
cate must first exhaust any administrative complaint proce-
dures. While up to now, those procedures have not provided 
any measurable relief to communities of color, EPA's Final 
Guidance for Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints 
may offer some relief. Relief may also be available, in the form 
of a judicial review of an agency decision, under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act in federal district court. While only equi-
table relief is available under the AP A, sovereign immunity of 
the federal agencies is expressly waived. In comparison, citizen 
suits under federal environmental statutes should prove more 
effective when Congress amends the citizen suit provisions, as 
498 
Maine, 448 U.S. at 9. 
499 • See, e.g., TOXIC Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(cX2) (West 1999); Clean 
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (West 1999); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
300j-8(d) (West 1999); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (West 1999); 
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (West 1999); Emergency Planning and Community 
Right-To-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11046(0 (West 1999). 
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it did with the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, to allow suits 
for wholly past violations. 
The environmental justice movement is a most worthy 
challenge that will benefit all of us. As Robert Bullard has rec-
ognized, "[a]s important as distributional equity is in the envi-
ronmental justice movement, equal pollution or equal risk is 
not the final objective. The environmental justice framework 
embodies the right of all individuals to be protected from envi-
ronmental hazards.,,500 
500 Robert D. Bullard, Unequal Environmental Protection: Incorporatino Environ-
mental Justice in Decision Makino, in WORST THINGS F'IRsT?: THE DEBATE OVER RISK 
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